Federal Courts Not Federal Tribunals by Mulligan, Lumen N.
Copyright  2010  by  Northwestern  University  School  of  Law Printed  in  U.S.A. 
Northwestern  University  Law  Review Vol. 104,  No.  1 
 
 
 
 175 
FEDERAL COURTS NOT FEDERAL TRIBUNALS 
Lumen N. Mulligan* 
INTRODUCTION...............................................................................................................175 
I. THE 28 U.S.C. § 1331 ARGUMENT .........................................................................182 
A. Unearthing the Tribunals Position ...............................................................182 
B. Three Challenges ..........................................................................................192 
II. THE ARTICLE III ARGUMENT..................................................................................208 
A. Article III Constrained by Writ Pleading......................................................210 
B. Two Challenges.............................................................................................213 
III. THE PROBLEM OF PRUDENCE AS JURISDICTION.......................................................224 
A. Doctrinal Havoc............................................................................................225 
B. Ripeness Redux .............................................................................................228 
CONCLUSION..................................................................................................................232 
INTRODUCTION 
“Raising up causes of action where a statute has not created them,” 
Justice Scalia wrote for the Court in Alexander v. Sandoval, “may be a 
proper function for common-law courts, but not for federal tribunals.”1  In 
contrasting the term “tribunal” with “court,” Justice Scalia unearths the no-
tion that the third branch of the federal government is jurisdictionally barred 
from inferring causes of action from federal statutes, while state common 
 
  
*  Associate Professor, Michigan State University College of Law.  I owe a great deal of thanks to 
many people.  First, research for this paper was generously supported by the Michigan State University 
College of Law’s research stipend program.  In addition, several of the outstanding research librarians at 
the Michigan State University College of Law, as well as numerous student research assistants who 
work under their direction, slaved over research requests on my behalf, including: Barbara Bean, Jane 
Edwards, Hildur Hanna, and Janet Hedin.  Many others have generously reviewed this work and offered 
insightful comments, including: Michael Allen, Brian Kalt, Barbara O’Brien, John Preis, Phillip Pucillo, 
Geoff Rapp, Lee Strang, and my wife, Emily Mulligan.  I also received numerous helpful comments 
from the participants at the Indiana University Maurer School of Law’s Big Ten Untenured Faculty 
Conference, the University of Toledo College of Law’s Workshop Series, the Loyola University Chi-
cago School of Law’s Colloquia, and the Michigan State University College of Law Faculty Colloquia.  
All remaining errors, of course, are my own.  
1  532 U.S. 275, 287 (2001) (citing Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 
U.S. 350, 365 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)).  The Court has flirted 
with this “tribunals” position at other times as well.  See, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 
304, 312 (1981) (“Federal courts, unlike state courts, are not general common-law courts and do not 
possess a general power to develop and apply their own rules of decision [i.e., causes of action].”). 
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law courts are not.  In what follows, I argue that such a jurisdictional bar 
lacks both statutory and constitutional foundations; to echo Justice Scalia’s 
phrase, we have a system of federal courts, not federal tribunals. 
The target of Justice Scalia’s ire is the practice of inferring causes of 
action from federal statutory rights.  A statute creates a right when, by clear 
language, it fashions mandatory, judicially enforceable obligations.2  A 
cause of action, by contrast, is the further determination that a person falls 
into a class of litigants empowered to vindicate a specified right in court.3  
Of course, Congress often couples explicit statutory causes of action with 
federal statutory rights.  But persons may hold federal rights without being 
authorized to enforce those rights in a federal court.4  For example, some 
statutes expressly vest this ability to vindicate rights only with an adminis-
trative agency, without granting the right-holder a cause of action.5  Or, as 
will be my focus, some statutes create rights without explicitly addressing 
the cause of action question at all.6  
For almost a century,7 the federal courts reviewed such statutory 
rights—those lacking explicit causes of action—to determine whether they 
 
  
2  See Wright v. City of Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 431–32 (1987) (holding that 
to be a “right” an obligation must not be vague or “beyond the competence of the judiciary to enforce”); 
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 24 (1980) (holding that to be a “right” an obli-
gation must be mandatory as opposed to merely hortatory); see also Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 
241 (1979) (defining “right”).  This tripartite test (viz., mandatory obligation, clear statement, and en-
forceability) remains the standard by which the Court determines when a federal right exists.  See, e.g., 
Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284 (2002); Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 341–42 (1997). 
3  See Passman, 442 U.S. at 239 n.18 (“[A] cause of action is a question of whether a particular 
plaintiff is a member of the class of litigants that may, as a matter of law, appropriately invoke the pow-
er of the court.”). 
4  See Donald H. Zeigler, Rights, Rights of Action, and Remedies: An Integrated Approach, 76 
WASH. L. REV. 67, 84–104 (2001) [hereinafter Zeigler, Integrated Approach] (criticizing this jurispru-
dential move). 
5  See, e.g., Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 457 (1974) 
(holding that power to vindicate rights at issue rested with the Attorney General).  See also Passman, 
442 U.S. at 241 (“For example, statutory rights and obligations are often embedded in complex regula-
tory schemes, so that if they are not enforced through private causes of action, they may nevertheless be 
enforced through alternative mechanisms, such as criminal prosecutions . . . or other public causes of 
actions.” (citing Cort v. Ash, 423 U.S. 812 (1975))). 
6  Cf. Mont.-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Nw. Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246, 261–62 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting) (“A duty declared by Congress does not evaporate for want of a formulated sanction.  When 
Congress has left the matter at large for judicial determination, our function is to decide what remedies 
are appropriate in the light of the statutory language and purpose and of the traditional modes by which 
courts compel performance of legal obligations . . . .  If civil liability is appropriate to effectuate the pur-
poses of a statute, courts are not denied this traditional remedy because it is not specifically authorized.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
7  Several Supreme Court cases cite Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916), as 
the first implied cause of action decision.  See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 
456 U.S. 353, 374 (1982); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 26 & n.2 
(1979) (White, J., dissenting); Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 689 (1979).  But some justices, 
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could infer a cause of action from the statute in question.  The United States 
Reporter overflows with cases in which the Court has protected the rights of 
individuals in just this manner.  These cases touch upon many of the most 
pressing issues facing the nation finding implied causes of action for: racial 
minorities suffering from retaliatory discrimination;8 persons disenfran-
chised;9 persons defrauded in securities transactions;10 women suffering dis-
crimination in higher education;11 companies bearing the costs of 
environmental remediation caused by third parties;12 and employees injured 
while on the job.13  This is not to say that the Court inferred a cause of ac-
                                                                                                                              
including Justice Brennan, have cited cases as far back as Marbury v. Madison.  See Jett v. Dallas Indep. 
Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 742 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
8  CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1951, 1958 (2008) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 al-
lows an implied cause of action for retaliatory discrimination).  The Court has protected the rights of ra-
cial minorities via inferred actions in other contexts as well.  See, e.g., Jett, 491 U.S. at 742 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (recognizing that for 100 years after the enactment of Section 1 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, 
the Court often recognized an implied cause of action where a statute creates substantive rights without 
specifying a remedy); Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 463 U.S. 582, 594–95 (1983) 
(plurality opinion) (recognizing an implied cause of action under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964). 
9  Morse v. Republican Party of Va., 517 U.S. 186, 231–32 (1996) (finding a private cause of action 
to enforce a Voting Rights Act provision that prohibits a poll tax). 
10  Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380–81 (1983) (recognizing an implied cause 
of action under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act).  The Court has protected the rights of in-
vestors via inferred actions in other contexts as well.  See, e.g., Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 
336, 341 (2005) (recognizing an implied cause of action for damages based on the Securities Exchange 
Act, as well as from SEC rules); Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 508 U.S. 286, 
297–98 (1993) (finding an implied right of contribution under SEC Rule 10b-5); Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. 
Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1090–91 (1991) (recognizing an implied cause of action under Securities Ex-
change Act Section 10(b)); Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 361 
(1991) (noting explicit congressional recognition that the Securities Exchange Act could have implied 
causes of action); Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 635 (1988) (recognizing an implied cause of action in 
securities litigation); Omni Capital Intern., Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., Ltd., 484 U.S. 97, 108 (1987) 
(concluding that nationwide service of process was not implicit in the Commodity Exchange Act, even 
though that Act did give rise to an implied cause of action); Curran, 456 U.S. at 395 (recognizing an 
implied cause of action for damages under the Commodities Exchange Act for fraud); J.I. Case Co. v. 
Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 434 (1964) (finding an inferred cause of action for violations of the Securities Ex-
change Act Section 14(a)). 
11  Cannon, 441 U.S. at 709 (recognizing an implied cause of action under Section 901(a) of Title IX 
of the Education Amendments of 1972).  The Court has protected the rights of women via inferred ac-
tions in other contexts as well.  See, e.g., Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 
526 U.S. 629, 632–33 (1999) (finding a limited implied cause of action under Title IX); Gebser v. Lago 
Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 285 (1998) (recognizing a limited implied cause of action under 
Title IX, but not applying it because the school district had no notice of the teacher’s sexual harass-
ment); Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 70–73 (1992) (recognizing that Congress’s 
revision of Title IX, which it undertook after Cannon, showed that Congress did not intend to limit the 
implied remedies available in Title IX). 
12  Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 816–17 (finding an implied remedy in Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act Section 107). 
13  Tex. & Pac. R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39–40 (1916) (inferring a cause of action under Sec-
tion 2 of the Safety Appliance Act of 1910).  The Court has protected the rights of workers via inferred 
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tion in every case, but this recitation highlights the critical remedial role 
that inferred cause of action doctrine has played.14  Recently, however, the 
Court has significantly restricted the practice of inferring causes of action 
from statutes.15 
Given the pressing policy issues at stake and the Court’s shifting doc-
trinal approaches, implied causes of action have proven fertile ground for 
scholars.  This body of literature has almost exclusively viewed the issue as 
one of statutory construction,16 separation of powers,17 federal common 
                                                                                                                              
actions in other contexts as well.  See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 183 (1967) (allowing an in-
ferred cause of action on the part of a union member against his union, where the union had a duty to 
fairly represent its members and allegedly failed to do so); Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 
323 U.S. 192, 204–07 (1944) (finding an implied cause of action in the Railway Labor Act); Tex. & 
New Orleans R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of S.S. & Ry. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 569–70 (1930) (inferring a cause of 
action under the Railway Labor Act of 1926). 
14  Considering just the last twenty years, this provides a substantial set of cases.  See, e.g., Ston-
eridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 164–66 (2008) (refusing to extend an im-
plied cause of action in Securities Exchange Act Section 10(b)); Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., 
Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 171 (2004) (failing to find an implied cause of action for contribution under the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act when the plaintiff had yet to 
be sued); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001) (refusing to infer a disparate impact cause of 
action from Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 348 (1997) 
(finding no implied cause of action in Title IV-D); Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 197–99 (1996) (failing 
to find an implied cause of action that expands the scope of liability for monetary damages to federal 
agencies based on the “equalization provision” of Section 1003 of the Rehabilitation Act Amendments 
of 1986); Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994) 
(finding no implied cause of action for aiding and abetting under Securities Exchange Act Section 
10(b)); Mertens v. Hewitt Assoc., 508 U.S. 248, 262–63 (1993) (finding no implied cause of action for 
monetary damages under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, where the Act explic-
itly authorized equitable relief); Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 363–64 (1992) (holding that the Adop-
tion Assistance and Child Welfare Act does not create an implied cause of action); Karahalios v. Nat’l 
Fed’n of Fed. Employees, Local 1263, 489 U.S. 527, 535–37 (1989) (failing to find an implied private 
cause of action in the Civil Service Reform Act because that Act gives the Federal Labor Relations 
Authority and its general counsel exclusive enforcement authority); Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 
174, 187 (1988) (finding no implied cause of action under the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act).  
15  See, e.g., Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 75 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating 
that the Court has “abandoned that power to invent ‘implications’ in the statutory field”). 
16  See, e.g., Robert H.A. Ashford, Implied Causes of Action Under Federal Laws: Calling the Court 
Back to Borak, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 227 (1984) (arguing, inter alia, on statutory construction grounds for 
more readily inferring causes of action); Richard Creswell, The Separation of Powers Implications of 
Implied Rights of Action, 34 MERCER L. REV. 973 (1983) (predicting the Court’s later focus on congres-
sional intent as the lodestar for inferring causes of action); Tamar Frankel, Implied Rights of Action, 67 
VA. L. REV. 553 (1981) (similar); Thomas A. Lambert, The Case Against Private Disparate Impact 
Suits, 34 GA. L. REV. 1155 (2000) (arguing against the inference of causes of action on statutory con-
struction, policy, and constitutional grounds); Bradford C. Mank, Are Anti-Retaliation Regulations in 
Title VI or Title IX Enforceable in a Private Right of Action: Does Sandoval or Sullivan Control This 
Question?, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 47 (2004) (arguing that both Titles implicitly allow for private caus-
es of action); Bradford C. Mank, Legal Context: Reading Statutes in Light of Prevailing Legal 
Precedent, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 815 (2002) [hereinafter Mank, Legal Context] (arguing that the determina-
tion of whether to infer a cause of action should be made in the light of judicial doctrine extant at the 
time the statute was passed). 
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law,18 or judicial prudence more generally.19  Recently, a new argument 
against the propriety of inferring causes of action has come fully to the fore, 
contending that “the Judiciary’s recognition of an implied private right of 
action necessarily extends” the jurisdiction of the federal courts.20  Borrow-
ing Justice Scalia’s phrase, I coin this the “tribunals position” as a short-
hand for the view that the federal judiciary is jurisdictionally barred from 
inferring causes of action.21 
Sandoval’s “tribunals” metaphor has not gone without notice, however.  
Professor Daniel Metlzer, for example, places it alongside other nonconsti-
tutional cases in which the Court shirked its traditional duty to create a 
workable legal system designed to solve day-to-day disputes.22  Professor 
                                                                                                                              
17  See, e.g., George D. Brown, Of Activism and Erie—The Implication Doctrine’s Implications for 
the Nature and Role of the Federal Courts, 69 IOWA L. REV. 617, 631 (1984) (making an analogy to the 
Erie doctrine to support the Court’s current restrictive approach to inferring causes of action); James D. 
Gordon III, Acorns and Oaks: Implied Rights of Action Under the Securities Acts, 10 STAN. J.L. BUS. & 
FIN. 62, 66–67 (2004) (arguing that inferring causes of action from the Securities Exchange Act is un-
constitutional). 
18  See, e.g., Paul Lund, The Decline of Federal Common Law, 76 B.U. L. REV. 895 (1996) (arguing 
that the Court has inappropriately restricted federal common law at the expense of federal rights hold-
ers); Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1985) (ar-
guing that inferring a cause of action is a species of federal common law and looking to federalism and 
separation of powers as limits to the same); John E. Noyes, Implied Rights of Action and the Use and 
Misuse of Precedent, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 145 (1987) (arguing that inferred causes of action are better 
construed as common law modified by statutory law). 
19  See, e.g., H. Miles Foy, Some Reflections on Legislation, Adjudication, and Implied Private Ac-
tions in the State and Federal Courts, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 501 (1986) (arguing from a historical per-
spective that federal courts should presume that causes of action are to be inferred); Susan J. Stabile, The 
Role of Congressional Intent in Determining the Existence of Implied Private Rights of Action, 71 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 861, 864–65 (1996) (arguing against congressional intent as the sole focus in de-
terminations of whether to infer a cause of action); Zeigler, Integrated Approach, supra note 4, at 68 
(criticizing the Court’s treatment of rights, rights of action, and remedies as separate inquiries); Donald 
H. Zeigler, Rights Require Remedies: A New Approach to the Enforcement of Rights in the Federal 
Courts, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 665, 666 (1987) [hereinafter Zeigler, Rights Require] (arguing that the exis-
tence of a federal right is sufficient to infer a cause of action to vindicate the right). 
20  Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 164–65 (2008) (internal 
citations and quotation marks omitted). 
21  As I hope to make clear, by “tribunals” I mean only an adjudicatory system that is jurisdictionally 
prohibited from inferring causes of action.  I use the label merely because it is catchy and maps onto a 
pithy quote from the Sandoval opinion.  By use of the term, I do not mean to imply any further limita-
tions upon the powers of the federal judiciary nor do I mean to reference non-Article III courts or the 
like. Cf. James Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of the United 
States, 118 HARV. L. REV. 643, 646–47 (2004) (employing the term “tribunal” to mean non-Article III 
courts).  My use of the term tribunal is more closely linked to Professor Strauss’s usage as a shorthand 
for Sandoval and related cases.  See Peter L. Strauss, Courts or Tribunals? Federal Courts and the 
Common Law, 53 ALA. L. REV. 891, 892 (2002).  But my jurisdictionally focused use of the term tribu-
nal does not neatly square with Professor Strauss’s usage.  See id. at 892–93 (“[T]he more recent conten-
tions over when, if ever, it is appropriate to infer privately enforceable judicial remedies in aid of federal 
statutes . . . seem[] to be about the nature of the institutions, not elements of their jurisdiction . . . .”). 
22  Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme Court’s Judicial Passivity, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 343, 362 (2002) 
(discussing Sandoval in the context of the Court’s overall philosophy of nonaction). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 180 
Peter Strauss views Sandoval as an ill-conceived reaction to the ever-
expanding codification of federal law, number of federal legal issues, and 
federal docket.23  Nevertheless, the scholarly literature has largely ignored 
the jurisdictional nature of the argument advanced by the tribunals posi-
tion.24   
With Sandoval and the Court’s deployment of the tribunals position in 
Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta in 2008,25 ignor-
ing the jurisdictional implications of the view is no longer wise.  Moreover, 
the tribunals position is beginning to receive scholarly proponents as well.26  
As such, the time is ripe for a thorough review of the tribunals position’s ju-
risdictional bar upon inferring causes of action. 
In this Article, I reject the tribunals position.  Even if it is poor judicial 
policy to recognize implied causes of action from statutes,27 such inferences 
 
  
23  Strauss, supra note 21, at 893–95 (discussing Sandoval and the tribunals position as part of the 
demise of common law reasoning and institutions). 
24  See, e.g., id. at 892–93 (contending that Sandoval is really “about the nature of the institutions, 
not elements of their jurisdiction”).  I believe only three scholarly pieces have addressed this jurisdic-
tional position advocated by Justice Scalia.  All of them do so in a cursory fashion.  See Martha A. Field, 
Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 883, 931 n.220 (1986) (reject-
ing the jurisdictional argument in a footnote); David Sloss, Constitutional Remedies for Statutory Viola-
tions, 89 IOWA L. REV. 355, 377 (2004) (“If federal courts lacked jurisdiction in such cases, then cases 
in which it is uncertain whether plaintiff has a valid federal cause of action would have to be adjudicated 
in state court, and state courts would assume primary responsibility for determining whether a federal 
statute creates a federal cause of action.  That result makes no sense.  Therefore, the remainder of this 
Article proceeds from the premise that the Bell [v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946),] approach to jurisdiction 
is justified.”); Louise Weinberg, The Curious Notion that the Rules of Decision Act Blocks Supreme 
Federal Common Law, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 860, 871 (1989) (similarly short treatment). 
25  Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 164–65. 
26  See Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Article III and the Cause of Action, 89 IOWA L. REV. 777, 838–51 
(2004) (arguing that an originalist understanding of Article III of the Constitution imposes limitations 
upon the powers of the federal courts to infer causes of action from statutes). 
27  This discussion, of course, touches upon the practice of inferring causes of action from the Con-
stitution as well.  See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 
388 (1971) (inferring a cause of action directly from the Fourth Amendment).  But inferring a cause of 
action from the Constitution, at least to some, raises very different issues than making such inferences 
from statutes.  See, e.g., Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 252 n.1 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) (“A 
court necessarily has wider latitude in interpreting the Constitution than it does in construing a statute.  
Moreover, the federal courts have a far greater responsibility under the Constitution for the protection of 
those rights derived directly from it, than for the definition and enforcement of rights created solely by 
Congress.” (internal citations omitted)); Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing Consti-
tution, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 289, 322 (1995) (arguing that constitutional rights are “self-executing” and 
that a legislatively created cause of action is not required to enforce them); John C. Jeffries, Jr., The 
Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87, 90 (1999) (arguing that a presumption in 
favor of monetary damages for constitutional violations could lead to less vigorous enforcement of con-
stitutional rights); Thomas S. Schrock & Robert C. Welsh, Reconsidering the Constitutional Common 
Law, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1117, 1145 (1978) (arguing that the Court lacks power to infer causes of action 
without congressional authority).  To keep this Article to a manageable length, I focus primarily upon 
inferring actions from statutory rights. 
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do not violate the jurisdictional limitations of 28 U.S.C. § 133128 or Article 
III.29  Indeed, this issue illustrates the general impropriety of turning pru-
dential questions into jurisdictional ones.  
In Part I, I discuss the argument that to infer a cause of action is to ex-
ceed the Court’s statutory federal question jurisdiction under § 1331.  After 
tracing the origins of this variation of the tribunals position, I offer three 
challenges.  First, I contend that the tribunals position incorrectly treats 
§ 1331 jurisdiction as centered upon successfully establishing a federal 
cause of action, when § 1331 jurisdiction is better understood as centered 
upon the distinct notion of a federal right.  Second, the Court’s recent will-
ingness to take § 1331 jurisdiction over state law causes of action with em-
bedded federal issues further undercuts the tribunals position—indeed, 
taking jurisdiction in such “hybrid cases” produces a pragmatic result that is 
nearly equivalent to taking jurisdiction over inferred causes of actions.  
Third, given that the Court considers it jurisdictionally permissible under 
§ 1331 to create federal common law, a fortiori, it should find jurisdiction 
to infer federal causes of action.  
In Part II, I turn to the argument that recognizing implied causes of ac-
tion violates Article III of the Constitution.  This view relies on the original-
ist30 notion that Article III incorporates an eighteenth-century understanding 
of causes of action, under the then-existing system of writ pleading.  I offer 
two intra-originalist critiques.  First, I apply the distinction between origi-
nalist interpretation and construction of the Constitution.  Even assuming 
that the originalist view correctly depicts the eighteenth-century understand-
ing of Article III, it does not convincingly address the more pressing ques-
tion of construction: how do we translate this writ pleading understanding 
of Article III into the present system that has abandoned writ pleading?  
Second, I contend that, in practice, even the most restrictive, originalist 
reading of the Article III limit upon the power to infer a cause of action is 
entirely redundant of contemporary standing analysis.  Thus even from an 
originalist point of view, if a plaintiff has standing, Article III places no fur-
ther restrictions upon the federal courts’ ability to infer a cause of action. 
In Part III, I draw some general lessons regarding the adjudication of 
matters that are traditionally treated as judicial policy under the guise of ju-
risdiction.  First, I consider the doctrinal and pragmatic havoc that results 
 
  
28  The statute provides: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising 
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”  28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006). 
29  The question of whether a federal statute should be construed to imply a federal cause of action 
necessarily arises as a matter of federal question, not diversity, jurisdiction.  This is the case as all such 
suits are premised upon the existence of a federal right, not a state law right coupled with diverse liti-
gants, in which Congress did not explicitly address the cause of action issue.  My inquiry into a jurisdic-
tional bar to the implication of causes of action, then, is related uniquely to federal question jurisdiction 
under Article III and 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 
30  See infra notes 256–261 and accompanying text (defining the public-meaning originalism school 
of constitutional interpretation). 
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when jurists take seriously this jurisdictional bar upon the inference of 
causes of action.  Second, I note that many of these same puzzles arise in 
other areas, such as ripeness doctrine, where the Court transformed a body 
of law previously considered a question of judicial prudence into one of ju-
risdiction.  From these observations, I surmise that, as a general matter, the 
Court picks a poor course when it conflates matters of prudence with juris-
diction.  Finally, I conclude that this long-lived argument about the wisdom 
of inferring causes of action should remain just that—an argument about 
judicial prudence, not subject matter jurisdiction.  
I. THE 28 U.S.C. § 1331 ARGUMENT 
The tribunals position—the notion that the federal courts are jurisdic-
tionally barred from inferring causes of actions—has two variations.  The 
first is predicated upon § 1331, the second upon Article III.  I take up the 
statutory version first.  I begin by tracing the evolution of this argument 
from dissents in the 1940s to majority opinions in this decade and by pro-
viding a synthesis of the position.  I then present three criticisms.  First, I 
contend that this statutory argument rests upon a poor understanding of 
§ 1331 jurisdiction, focusing improperly upon successfully establishing a 
federal cause of action instead of merely asserting a federal right.  Second, I 
argue that the Court’s recent re-embrace of § 1331 jurisdiction over hybrid 
claims devalues the tribunals position by taking jurisdiction over these 
pragmatic cousins of inferred causes of action.  I end by noting that if the 
much broader power of creating federal common law is consistent with 
§ 1331 jurisdiction, then the lesser power of inferring a cause of action is as 
well.  
A. Unearthing the Tribunals Position 
It is useful to divide the Supreme Court’s inferred cause of action ju-
risprudence into four eras.31  The first era predates the Court’s seminal 1964 
J.I. Case Co. v. Borak32 opinion.  By most accounts, the Court first inferred 
a cause of action from a federal statute in Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. 
Rigsby.33  There is some debate over whether the Court freely, or restrict-
 
  
31  Cf. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 394 (5th ed. 2007) (dividing the Court’s doc-
trine into three eras, but not accounting for a pre-Borak era).   
32  377 U.S. 426 (1964). 
33  241 U.S. 33, 39–40 (1916) (inferring a cause of action under Section 2 of the Safety Appliance 
Act of 1910); see also Tex. & New Orleans R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 569–
70 (1930) (applying the Rigsby doctrine); See cases cited supra note 7 (noting Supreme Court opinions 
that cite Rigsby as the first inferred cause of action case).  But see Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 
U.S. 701, 742 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (listing five pre-Rigsby inferred cause of action cases, in-
cluding Marbury). 
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edly, inferred causes of action from federal statutes during this early era.34  
But all agree that the Court reached its zenith in terms of freely inferring 
causes of action from federal statutes during the Borak era of the 1960s.  
This era is characterized by the view that federal courts should infer a cause 
of action when doing so would further the legislative purpose of the act, 
even if there existed no evidence of congressional intent that a private cause 
of action should lie.35  Yet a third era of inferred causes of action jurispru-
dence arose with the Berger Court’s opinion in Cort v. Ash.36  Cort an-
nounced a new four-prong test, which looked at, among other things, 
congressional intent that a cause of action should lie.37  Employing this 
standard, the Court became more restrictive in its decisions to infer causes 
of action from federal statutes.38  The fourth—and present—era began at the 
end of the 1970s with Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington.39  Although Touche 
Ross did not formally overrule Cort, the Court held that “our task is limited 
solely to determining whether Congress intended to create the private right 
of action.”40  As members of the Court have noted, Touche Ross overruled 
the Cort analysis in all but name by adopting a unitary test for the creation 
of an implied cause of action.41  Although the Court has continued to infer 
causes of action on occasion during this era, it has generally disapproved of 
the practice.42 
 
  
34  Compare Zeigler, Integrated Approach, supra note 4, at 69, 83 (finding that the traditional view 
more freely recognized the functional equivalent to an inferred cause of action), with Cannon v. Univ. of 
Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 732–35 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) (stating that before Borak the Court rarely 
inferred a cause of action from a federal statute). 
35  Borak, 377 U.S. at 432–33; see also Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 
404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971) (inferring a cause of action from SEC Rule 10b-5 using the Borak standard); 
Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 557 (1969) (inferring a cause of action from the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965 using the Borak standard); Mank, Legal Context, supra note 16, at 845 (discussing 
Borak). 
36  422 U.S. 66 (1975). 
37  The Court held that it would infer a cause of action when: (1) the statute was enacted for the spe-
cial benefit of a class of persons of which the plaintiff is a member; (2) there is any indication of legisla-
tive intent, express or implied, to create a remedy; (3) inferring a private remedy would not frustrate the 
underlying legislative scheme; and (4) inferring a private federal remedy is appropriate because the sub-
ject matter is not solely a matter of state concern.  Id. at 78. 
38  See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 31, at 396. 
39  442 U.S. 560 (1979). 
40  Id. at 568. 
41  See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 189 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing, in 
an opinion joined by Justice O’Connor, that “[i]t could not be plainer that we effectively overruled the 
Cort v. Ash analysis in Touche Ross & Co” by “converting one of its four factors (congressional intent) 
into the determinative factor, with the other three merely indicative of its presence or absence”). 
42  For example, the Court has inferred causes of action from statutes twice since issuing Sandoval.  
See CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1951, 1958 (2008) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 allows 
an implied cause of action for retaliatory discrimination); Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 
341 (2005) (recognizing an implied cause of action for damages based on the Securities Exchange Act, 
as well as from SEC rules).  But on the whole, the history of the Touche Ross era is one where such in-
ferences are not made.  See supra note 14 (listing cases declining to infer causes of action). 
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Although the Court’s substantive doctrine has shifted greatly over the 
decades, its jurisdictional doctrine has—until recently—been remarkably 
stable.  If sheer volume of past Supreme Court holdings entirely controlled 
the issue, the question of whether the implication of a cause of action is ju-
risdictional would be easily answered.  The cases are legion in holding that 
the inference, or lack thereof, of a cause of action either from a federal stat-
ute43 or the Constitution44 does not implicate the court’s jurisdiction.  
The leading case affirming the jurisdiction of federal courts to infer 
causes of action is Bell v. Hood.45  In Bell, the plaintiffs brought suit against 
several FBI agents for illegal arrest, false imprisonment, and unlawful 
searches and seizures.46  The plaintiffs asserted that these acts violated the 
Fourth and Fifth Amendments and asked the Court to infer a cause of action 
directly from the Constitution.47  The Court assumed that the plaintiffs al-
leged viable constitutional violations.48  The only question was whether the 
Court had jurisdiction to infer a cause of action for monetary damages.49  
The Court held that it did, stating that “where the complaint . . . is so drawn 
as to seek recovery directly under the Constitution . . . the federal 
court . . . must entertain the suit” regardless of whether the cause of action 
is actually inferred at the end of the day.50  It held that the taking of jurisdic-
tion precedes the question of whether to infer a cause of action.51  This hold-
 
  
43  The Court has squarely held that “[i]t is firmly established in our cases that the absence of a valid 
(as opposed to arguable) cause of action does not implicate subject matter jurisdiction, i.e., the courts’ 
statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.”  Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 
U.S. 83, 89 (1998).  Just reviewing the past thirty years, the Court has offered this holding on numerous 
occasions.  See, e.g., Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 535 U.S. 635, 642–43 (2002); Nw. Air-
lines, Inc. v. County of Kent, 510 U.S. 355, 365 (1994); Air Courier Conference v. Postal Workers, 498 
U.S. 517, 523 n.3 (1991); Thompson, 484 U.S. at 178; Jackson Transit Auth. v. Local Div. 1285, Amal-
gamated Transit Union, 457 U.S. 15, 21 n.6 (1982); Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 476 n.5 (1979).  
44  See, e.g., Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 236 (1979); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study 
Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 71–72 (1978) (holding existence of implied cause of action directly under the 
Constitution is not a jurisdictional question); Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 279 
(1977) (holding that the existence of an implied cause of action directly under the Constitution is not a 
jurisdictional question); Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 649 (1963) (same); see also Field, supra 
note 24, at 931–32 n.220 (“Congress has nowhere manifested an intention that federal courts exercise 
federal question jurisdiction only when a federal remedy exists.”). 
45  327 U.S. 678 (1946). 
46  Id. at 679.   
47  Id. at 679–80. 
48  Id. at 683. 
49  Id. at 684. 
50  Id. at 681–82. 
51  Id. at 682 (“The reason for this is that the court must assume jurisdiction to decide whether the al-
legations state a cause of action on which the court can grant relief as well as to determine issues of fact 
arising in the controversy.”). 
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ing, then, distinguished jurisdiction from the on-the-merits issue of whether 
the Court should infer a cause of action.52  
Despite this authority, a longstanding string of opinions assert the con-
trary position.  Chief Justice Stone, dissenting in Bell, offers an apt starting 
point in tracing this line of argument.  He argued, unexceptionally, that a 
nonjurisdictional dismissal is the appropriate course when a statute (or the 
Constitution) definitively provides a cause of action but the plaintiff’s par-
ticular complaint fails to plead or prove the facts needed to succeed.53  
When, however, the federal statutory or constitutional provision in question 
does not “afford[] a remedy to any person,” he continued, “the mere asser-
tion by a plaintiff that he is entitled to such a remedy cannot be said to sat-
isfy jurisdictional requirements.”54  Under Chief Justice Stone’s view, then, 
if a cause of action would not be available to any plaintiff under any set of 
averred facts, then the federal court lacks jurisdiction.  To hold otherwise, 
Chief Justice Stone contended, would raise two problems.  First, it would 
impermissibly delegate the courts’ task of evaluating their jurisdiction to 
the plaintiffs’ unsubstantiated pleadings.55  Second, it would raise federal-
ism concerns by transferring traditionally state law cases to federal court.56  
This line of reasoning emerged from time to time during the pre-Borak 
era.  In Jacobson v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., for example, the Supreme 
Court summarily affirmed the First Circuit’s adoption of the tribunals posi-
tion.57  In Jacobson, the plaintiff sought to recover for an alleged negligent 
death in a railroad accident.58  One of the plaintiff’s theories of recovery 
was that the court should infer a civil remedy under the Safety Appliance 
Act.59  The First Circuit declined to do so.60  Of import to my discussion, the 
circuit considered this failure to infer a cause of action as a statutory juris-
dictional defect.  The court held that “the subject matter of the cause of ac-
tion stated in the amended complaint was not within the jurisdiction of the 
 
  
52  Id. (“[I]t is well settled that the failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the 
merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction.”). 
53  Id. at 685 (Stone, C.J., dissenting). 
54  Id. at 686. 
55  Id. at 685 (“Whether the complaint states such a cause of action is for the court, not the pleader, 
to say.”). 
56  Id. at 686 (“The only effect of holding, as the Court does, that jurisdiction is conferred by the 
pleader’s unfounded assertion that he is one who can have a remedy for damages arising under the 
Fourth and Fifth Amendments is to transfer to the federal court the trial of the allegations of trespass to 
person and property, which is a cause of action arising wholly under state law.”). 
57  206 F.2d 153 (1st Cir. 1953), aff’d per curiam, 347 U.S. 909 (1954). 
58  Id. at 154. 
59  Id. (citing Safety Appliance Act, 45 U.S.C. § 1 (repealed 1994)). 
60  Id. at 157 (“But it is abundantly clear that the federal courts have not, as a matter of federal com-
mon law, developed a private right of action for damages for personal injuries resulting from a breach of 
the Safety Appliance Acts, in favor of persons not entitled to sue under the provisions of the Employers’ 
Liability Acts.”). 
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court below under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  It was not a civil action arising ‘under 
the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States.’”61 
Justice Powell, in his dissenting opinion in Cannon v. University of 
Chicago,62 provided the preeminent argument from the bench that inferring 
a cause of action is extrajurisdictional.63  In Cannon, the Court inferred a 
cause of action for private individuals to enforce Section 901(a) of Title IX 
of the Education Amendments of 1972, which prohibits sex discrimination 
in educational institutions receiving federal funding.64  Justice Powell made 
two arguments in dissent.  First, he argued that crafting a cause of action 
was a uniquely legislative function and thus reserved for Congress under 
Article I of the Constitution.65  Second, Justice Powell insisted that creating 
causes of action concomitantly expands the federal courts’ § 1331 jurisdic-
tion.  In so arguing, he relied heavily upon the Holmes test,66 which is the 
view that claims only arise under § 1331 if the plaintiff pleads a federal 
cause of action.  Following this approach, Justice Powell found the Court’s 
inference of a cause of action to be of jurisdictional dimension because the 
very act of inferring the federal cause of action creates the analytic hook for 
taking § 1331 jurisdiction.67  But, Justice Powell reminded, the Constitution 
securely lodges jurisdictional control over the lower federal courts within 
Congress’s bailiwick.68  Thus, inferring a cause of action from a statute, in 
Justice Powell’s view, represents an extrajurisdictional endeavor, because it 
necessarily vests § 1331 jurisdiction by judicial decision instead of legisla-
tive fiat.69 
 
  
61  Id. at 158. 
62  441 U.S. 677 (1979). 
63  See Field, supra note 24, 931 n.220 (characterizing Justice Powell’s argument as jurisdictional); 
Noyes, supra note 18, at 156–57 (same). 
64  Cannon, 441 U.S. at 717.  
65  Id. at 732 (Powell, J., dissenting) (“[The] implication applied by the Court today . . . represents 
judicial assumption of the legislative function.”); see infra Part II.A (providing a more detailed account 
of the Article III difficulty).   
66  See infra notes 113–119 and accompanying text (defining and discussing the Holmes test).   
67  Cannon, 441 U.S. at 746–47 (Powell, J., dissenting) (“Implication of a private cause of action, in 
contrast, involves a significant additional step.  By creating a private action, a court of limited jurisdic-
tion necessarily extends its authority to embrace a dispute Congress has not assigned it to resolve.  This 
runs contrary to the established principle that the jurisdiction of the federal courts is carefully guarded 
against expansion by judicial interpretation and conflicts with the authority of Congress under Art. III to 
set the limits of federal jurisdiction.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). 
68  Id. 
69  Justice Powell has expressed this view in other opinions as well.  See Jackson Transit Auth. v. 
Local Div. 1285, Amalgamated Transit Union, 457 U.S. 15, 29–30 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring) (re-
stating his dissent in Cannon); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 395 
(1982) (Powell, J., dissenting) (same); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 26–29 (1980) (Powell, J., concur-
ring) (same).  Interestingly, Justice Powell did not view the inference of a cause of action from the Con-
stitution as raising jurisdictional concerns.  See supra note 27. 
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A decade later, Justice Scalia began championing the tribunals posi-
tion.  In Thompson v. Thompson, the Court held that the Parental Kidnap-
ping Prevention Act does not create a cause of action for individuals.70  
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment, but wrote separately to lay out his 
view on crafting causes of action by inference.  Justice Scalia stated that the 
Court should adopt “the categorical position that federal private rights of 
action will not be implied.”71  He supported this position with three planks.  
First, he offered Justice Powell’s jurisdictional argument in toto by way of a 
substantial quotation from his dissent in Cannon.72  Second, Justice Scalia 
offered a statutory construction argument, contending that congressional in-
tent may not be found by inference, but only from explicit text and struc-
ture.73  Third, he offered a policy argument, insisting that a bright-line 
rule—no inferred causes of action—would be welcomed by Congress, pro-
viding its members a clear background rule of construction against which to 
legislate.74  Having marshaled these arguments, Justice Scalia concluded 
that the Court “should get out of the business of implied private rights of 
action altogether.”75 
Three years later, Justice Scalia renewed this argument in his concur-
ring opinion in Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson.76  
In Lampf, the Court declined to borrow state statutes of limitations for suits 
raising causes of action implied under Section 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act, even though such borrowing is the typical mode for gaining a 
limitations period for implied federal causes of action.77  Instead, the Court 
employed the limitations period included in the Securities Exchange Act for 
explicitly created causes of action.78  Justice Scalia used this case as an op-
portunity to attack the entire enterprise of inferring causes of action.79  In 
this short concurrence, he for the first time employed the pithy, though 
sphinxlike, phrase: “Raising up causes of action where a statute has not cre-
ated them may be a proper function for common-law courts, but not for 
federal tribunals.”80  Although the meaning of this phrase is not immediately 
transparent, Justice Scalia’s citation to the jurisdictional argument in his 
 
  
70  484 U.S. 174, 187 (1988). 
71  Id. at 191 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
72  Id. (quoting a substantial portion of Justice Powell’s Cannon dissent). 
73  Id. at 188–89, 191–92. 
74  Id. at 192 (“I believe, moreover, that Congress would welcome the certainty that such a rule 
would produce.  Surely conscientious legislators cannot relish the current situation, in which the exis-
tence or nonexistence of a private right of action depends upon which of the opposing legislative forces 
may have guessed right as to the implications the statute will be found to contain.”). 
75  Id. 
76  501 U.S. 350 (1991). 
77  Id. at 362.  
78  Id.  
79  Id. at 365 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
80  Id. 
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Thompson concurrence and to Justice Powell’s Cannon dissent81 indicate 
that he distinguished federal tribunals from common law courts on the basis 
of jurisdictional competence.82  
Until 2001, the view that inferring a cause of action is jurisdictionally 
problematic had yet to make its way into a majority opinion.  But in Alex-
ander v. Sandoval,83 Justice Scalia introduced the notion into the holding of 
the majority opinion.  In Sandoval, the Court held that it would not infer a 
cause of action for individuals to enforce disparate impact discrimination 
claims under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for the imposition of 
an English-only rule for the administration of driver’s license examina-
tions.84  After concluding that Congress did not imply such a cause of ac-
tion, the Court noted that “[i]mplicit in our discussion thus far has been a 
particular understanding of the genesis of private causes of action.”85  The 
Court then noted that statutory intent is the seminal criterion for determin-
ing whether a cause of action was extant to enforce statutory rights.86  From 
this truism of the Touche Ross era, Justice Scalia jumps to the conclusion: 
“Raising up causes of action where a statute has not created them may be a 
proper function for common-law courts, but not for federal tribunals,” quot-
ing his own concurring opinion in Lampf.87 
Again this phrase, standing on its own, does not reveal the jurisdic-
tional nature of the argument.  Indeed, the Court has at times characterized 
Sandoval as merely extending the Touche Ross era, which focuses solely 
upon congressional intent as the determinate for inferring a cause of ac-
tion.88  In line with this view, the Court has not entirely abandoned the prac-
tice of inferring causes of action after Sandoval.89   
 
  
81  Id. 
82  Even if this is not the best reading of the phrase, it is certainly the thrust of Justice Scalia’s argu-
ment.  Thus I find it fair to assign this jurisdictional meaning to the phrase. 
83  532 U.S. 275 (2001). 
84  Id. at 293. 
85  Id. at 286. 
86  Id. 
87  Id. at 287 (quoting Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 365 
(1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
88  See, e.g., Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284 n.3 (2002) (“Where a statute does not include 
this sort of explicit ‘right- or duty-creating language,’ we rarely impute to Congress an intent to create a 
private right of action.  See . . . Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 288 (2001) (existence or absence 
of rights-creating language is critical to the Court’s inquiry).”). 
89  See, e.g., CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1951, 1958 (2008) (holding that 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1981 allows an implied cause of action for retaliatory discrimination); Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 
544 U.S. 336, 341 (2005) (recognizing an implied cause of action for damages based on the Securities 
Exchange Act, as well as from SEC rules).  There remains a similar willingness to infer causes of action 
on occasion in the circuits.  See, e.g., Care Choices HMO v. Engstrom, 330 F.3d 786, 788–90 (6th Cir. 
2003) (“Absent an express private right of action, federal courts may in certain circumstances find an 
implied right of action.”). 
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On the other hand, there is strong support for a jurisdictional reading of 
Sandoval.  First, Justice Scalia quoted his concurrence in Lampf—an opin-
ion which itself cited Justice Powell’s Cannon dissent as well as Justice 
Scalia’s past nonmajority opinions, such as in Thompson, which clearly ad-
vanced a jurisdictional argument.  Second, and more persuasively, both Jus-
tice Scalia and the majority in Stoneridge Investment Partners characterize 
Sandoval as a jurisdictional opinion.90   
Justice Scalia made this point in his concurring opinion to Correctional 
Services Corp. v. Malesko,91 where the Court refused to infer a cause of ac-
tion directly from the Eighth Amendment in a Bivens action against a gov-
ernment contractor operating a halfway house for the Bureau of Prisons.92  
He noted that “Bivens is a relic of the heady days in which this Court as-
sumed common law powers to create causes of action—decreeing them to 
be ‘implied’ by the mere existence of a statutory or constitutional prohibi-
tion.”93  Citing Sandoval, he asserted that the Court has “abandoned that 
power to invent ‘implications’ in the statutory field.”94  In Malesko, then, 
Justice Scalia characterized Sandoval both as an absolute bar upon the im-
plication of causes of action from statutes and as a decision having to do 
with judicial power, a term used by the Court and commentators synony-
mously with jurisdiction.95 
 
  
90  Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 164–65 (2008); Lampf, 501 
U.S. at 365 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
91  534 U.S. 61, 75 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring).  Unlike Justice Powell, Justice Scalia finds that 
inferring causes of action is extrajurisdictional in the constitutional context as well.  See id. 
92  Id. at 74. 
93  Id. at 75.  
94  Id.; see also Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 568 (2007) (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., con-
curring) (providing a nearly verbatim restatement of Justice Scalia’s Malesko concurring opinion). 
95  The Court and commentators define jurisdiction in terms of power with great regularity.  Indeed, 
it is the black letter view.  See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002), overruling Ex parte 
Bain, 121 U.S. 1 (1887) (“Bain’s elastic concept of jurisdiction is not what the term ‘jurisdiction’ means 
today, i.e., ‘the courts’ statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.’”); Steel Co. v. Citizens 
for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (holding that a court lacking jurisdiction lacks power to issue 
judgment); Lindahl v. Office of Personnel Mgmt., 470 U.S. 768, 793 n.30 (1985) (distinguishing venue 
from jurisdiction, which relates to a “power of the court”); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239 n.18 
(1979) (describing subject matter jurisdiction as the power of the court); McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 
90, 91 (1917) (“The foundation of jurisdiction is physical power.”); Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 
Wall.) 506, 514 (1868) (“Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause.  Jurisdiction 
is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that 
of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.”); Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 
657, 718 (1838) (“Jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine the subject matter in controversy be-
tween parties to a suit, to adjudicate or exercise any judicial power over them . . . .  If the law confers the 
power to render a judgment or decree, then the court has jurisdiction.”).  But see Evan Tsen Lee, The 
Dubious Concept of Jurisdiction, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1613, 1620 (2003) (arguing that jurisdiction is a 
matter of “something like legitimate authority”); Alex Lees, Note, The Jurisdictional Label: Use and 
Misuse, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1457, 1470–77 (2006) (listing the three major theories which seek to explain 
the concept of jurisdiction as power, legitimacy, and legislative control).  For a rejection of the practical 
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Finally, in a 2008 majority opinion, Justice Kennedy relied on the sup-
posed extrajurisdictional nature of inferring a cause of action as grounds for 
dismissing a complaint.  In that case, Stoneridge Investment Partners, the 
plaintiffs asked the Court to recognize an implied aiding and abetting cause 
of action in Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act.96  The Court de-
clined to do so.97  In so holding, the Court relied heavily upon the extraju-
risdictional argument.98  The Court—quoting substantially from Justice 
Powell’s Cannon dissent and citing Sandoval—held that “the Judiciary’s 
recognition of an implied private right of action necessarily extends its au-
thority to embrace a dispute Congress has not assigned it to resolve.  This 
runs contrary to the established principle that the jurisdiction of the federal 
courts is carefully guarded against expansion by judicial interpretation.”99 
In light of this history, the statutory version of the tribunals position 
may be fairly captured as follows.  The argument, at its heart, is an interpre-
tation of statutory federal question jurisdiction under § 1331 that relies 
heavily upon the Holmes test.100  The Holmes test101 asserts that § 1331 ju-
risdiction vests only if the plaintiff’s cause of action is federal in origin.  
Thus, when the judiciary infers a federal cause of action, it concomitantly 
expands its own jurisdiction under § 1331.102  Putting the argument differ-
ently, under the Holmes test, until the court infers the federal cause of ac-
tion there is no basis upon which to take § 1331 jurisdiction; thus, the entire 
inference discussion is extrajurisdictional.103  Moreover, this jurisdiction-
expanding view of inferring causes of action runs afoul of the traditional 
view that vests control over the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts firm-
ly in Congress’s bailiwick.104   
                                                                                                                              
import of Professor Tsen Lee’s view, see Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction and Merits, 80 WASH. L. 
REV. 643, 670–78 (2005).  
96  552 U.S. 148, 152–53 (2008). 
97  Id. at 165–66.   
98  Id. at 164–66. 
99  Id. at 164–65 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).   
100  See, e.g., Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 165 (“The determination of who can seek a remedy has signifi-
cant consequences for the reach of federal power.”).   
101  See infra notes 113–119 and accompanying text (defining and discussing the Holmes test).  
102  See, e.g., Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 746 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) (“By creat-
ing a private action, a court of limited jurisdiction necessarily extends its authority to embrace a dispute 
Congress has not assigned it to resolve.”). 
103  See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 685–86 (1946) (Stone, C.J., dissenting). 
104  Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 341–42 (1969) (“[T]he Constitution specifically vests that power 
[to expand the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts] in the Congress, not in the courts.”).  By most ac-
counts, Congress retains broad control of the jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts, and it may grant a 
narrower scope of subject matter jurisdiction than is found in Article III.  See, e.g., Paul M. Bator, Con-
gressional Power Over the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1030, 1030–38 (1982) 
(espousing the traditional view that Congress is not required by Article III to vest full constitutional sub-
ject matter jurisdiction in the inferior federal courts); Barry Friedman, A Different Dialogue: The Su-
preme Court, Congress and Federal Jurisdiction, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (1990) (“[C]ommentators 
mark out their individual lines defining the precise scope of Congress’s authority, but no one has chal-
104:175  (2010) Federal Courts Not Federal Tribunals 
 191 
I contest the soundness of this argument in detail below.  Before mov-
ing to this critique, however, it is worth noting that adherents of the tribu-
nals position espouse competing variations of the view.  One interpretation 
finds that the extrajurisdictional nature of inferred causes of action creates 
an absolute bar to their recognition.105  Other interpretations temper the po-
sition by finding inferences of a cause of action extrajurisdictional only 
when congressional intent does not justify the inference106 (as determined 
only by text and structure107 or extratextual108 materials).  Even this most 
welcoming position, however, makes the strong claim that statutory juris-
dictional concerns, rather than judicial prudence, require the sole focus 
upon congressional intent as the determinate for whether a cause of action 
should be inferred.109  Even under this most lenient interpretation, then, the 
actions of the Court during the Cort, Borak, and pre-Borak eras were not 
merely unwise, but extrajurisdictional.  Moreover, even in the Touche Ross 
era with its sole focus on congressional intent, this most lenient interpreta-
tion presents the striking consequence of turning “wrongly” decided statu-
tory construction cases into extrajurisdictional dalliances.  Thus any 
                                                                                                                              
lenged the central assumption that Congress bears primary responsibility for defining federal court juris-
diction.”); James Leonard, Ubi Remedium Ibi Jus, or, Where There’s a Remedy, There’s a Right: A 
Skeptic’s Critique of Ex Parte Young, 54 SYRACUSE L. REV. 215, 277 (2004) (“[T]he jurisdiction of the 
lower courts is a matter of legislative discretion and not of ‘need’ defined from Article III.”); Lawrence 
Gene Sager, Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress’ Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction 
of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 25 (1980) (“Courts and commentators agree that Congress’ 
discretion in granting jurisdiction to the lower federal courts implies that those courts take jurisdiction 
from Congress and not from [A]rticle III.”).  Of course, some espouse the opposite view.  See, e.g., Ak-
hil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 
65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 209 (1985) (arguing that Congress must vest some of the Article III heads of juris-
diction in the federal judiciary); Laurence H. Tribe, Jurisdictional Gerrymandering: Zoning Disfavored 
Rights Out of the Federal Courts, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 129, 134 (1981) (arguing that there are 
non-Article III limits to Congress’s discretion in vesting inferior federal courts with subject matter juris-
diction).  
105  See Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 75 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that 
the Court has “abandoned that power to invent ‘implications’ in the statutory field”); Thompson v. 
Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 192 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (advocating that the Court “announce a flat 
rule that private rights of action will not be implied in statutes”). 
106  See, e.g., Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 164–65 (2008) 
(predicating the jurisdictional problem upon a lack of congressional intent). 
107  See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 289 (2001) (“We therefore begin (and find that 
we can end) our search for Congress’s intent with the text and structure of Title VI.”); Thompson, 484 
U.S. at 179 (critiquing, implicitly, Justice Scalia’s position as creating “a virtual dead letter [doctrine,] 
. . . limited to . . . drafting errors when Congress simply forgot to codify its . . . intention to provide a 
cause of action”); see also id. at 190–91 (Scalia, J., concurring) (responding to the majority’s critique of 
his view). 
108  See, e.g., Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 165 (citing a Senate Report, clearly a non-textualist source, as 
evidence of congressional intent). 
109  See, e.g., Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 742 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) (“If only a 
matter of statutory construction were involved, our obligation might be to develop more refined criteria 
which more accurately reflect congressional intent.  ‘But the unconstitutionality of the course pursued 
has now been made clear’ . . . .”). 
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interpretation of the tribunals position presents jurisdictional questions wor-
thy of serious consideration. 
One last clarification is in order before I proceed to my critique.  Re-
jecting the tribunals position with its jurisdictional impediments to inferring 
causes of action does not require one to embrace the practice of inferring 
causes of action as otherwise legitimate.  Chief Justice Rehnquist, for ex-
ample, was no champion of the inferred cause of action.110  Yet he accepted 
that it is “analytically correct to view the question of jurisdiction as dis-
tinct” from the question of whether to infer a cause of action in any given 
case.111  His objections to the practice, weighty to be sure, were lodged in 
his overarching judicial minimalist philosophy rather than doctrinal argu-
ments about jurisdiction.112   
B. Three Challenges 
I turn next to three critiques of the statutory version of the tribunals po-
sition.  I begin by arguing that the tribunals position is predicated upon 
misunderstandings of how jurisdiction vests under § 1331.  I begin by not-
ing that the Holmes test requires only an assertion of a federal cause of ac-
tion, not a successful claim to one.  Further, I contend that the Holmes test 
offers a poor rubric for explaining § 1331 jurisdiction.  I next argue that the 
Court’s embrace of hybrid claims under § 1331 presents a serious hurdle to 
the tribunals position.  I end by noting that the Court’s jurisdictional treat-
ment of federal common law cases presents a significant difficulty for the 
tribunals position as well. 
1. A Faulty View of § 1331 Jurisdiction.—I turn now to § 1331 doc-
trine as it intersects with the tribunals position.  The federal courts regard 
all claims to § 1331 jurisdiction as subject to the well-pleaded complaint 
rule.113  Following this rule, only federal issues raised in a plaintiff’s com-
plaint, not anticipated defenses, establish federal question jurisdiction.114  
The majority of federal question cases, according to the standard view, meet 
 
  
110  See, e.g., id. at 718 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (“It seems to me that the factors to which I have 
here briefly adverted apprise the lawmaking branch of the Federal Government that the ball, so to speak, 
may well now be in its court.  Not only is it far better for Congress to so specify when it intends private 
litigants to have a cause of action, but for this very reason this Court in the future should be extremely 
reluctant to imply a cause of action absent such specificity on the part of the Legislative Branch.” (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)).  
111  Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 37 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
112  See id. (“[C]ongressional authority here may all too easily be undermined when the judiciary, 
under the guise of exercising its authority to fashion appropriate relief, creates expansive damages re-
medies that have not been authorized by Congress.”). 
113  See Donald L. Doernberg, There’s No Reason for It; It’s Just Our Policy: Why the Well-Pleaded 
Complaint Rule Sabotages the Purposes of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 38 HASTINGS L. J. 597, 598–
99 (1987). 
114  Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908) (establishing the well-
pleaded complaint rule). 
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the § 1331 requirements115 because federal law creates the plaintiff’s cause 
of action.116  Indeed, this linguistic understanding of § 1331, which places 
great importance upon the “law that creates the cause of action,”117  has 
come to dominate all discussion of statutory federal question jurisdiction.118  
This position is generally referred to as the Holmes test, after Justice 
Holmes, who originally formulated the test in American Well Works Co. v. 
Layne & Bowler Co.119 
The prominence of the Holmes test for taking § 1331 jurisdiction, I 
contend, explains the prima facie appeal of the tribunals position.  The pro-
ponents of the tribunals position, for example, clearly adhere to the Holmes 
test as a basis for their conclusions.120  If, as the Holmes test suggests, the 
federal origin of the cause of action is the necessary trigger for federal ju-
risdiction under § 1331, the statutory version of the tribunals position would 
be sound.  
I argue, however, that the tribunals position rests upon two significant 
misunderstandings of § 1331 doctrine.  First, I note that even under the 
Holmes test, § 1331 doctrine seldom requires plaintiffs to actually establish 
a federal cause of action in order to vest the court with jurisdiction.  Rather, 
plaintiffs most often establish § 1331 jurisdiction by merely asserting a fed-
eral cause of action.  Despite the assumption of the tribunals position, then, 
the actual existence of a federal cause of action is not a necessary jurisdic-
tional element.  Second, I argue that the Holmes test, with its myopic focus 
upon the federal origin of the cause of action as the key to vesting § 1331 
jurisdiction, fails to capture the Court’s actual practice in § 1331 cases.  The 
Court’s practice, I contend, finds the assertion of a federal right, not cause 
of action, as the indispensible jurisdictional element.  As the tribunals posi-
tion rests upon this Holmes-test understanding of § 1331 jurisdiction, dis-
 
  
115  Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986). 
116  Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916) (Holmes, J.) (“A suit 
arises under the law that creates the cause of action.”).  
117  Id.  
118  The classic presentation of the Holmes test was made in 1916.  See id.  A Westlaw search for ci-
tations to the “headnote” corresponding to this quote returned 408 citations on October 7, 2009.  See, 
e.g., Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005) (“This provi-
sion for federal question jurisdiction is invoked by and large by plaintiffs pleading a cause of action cre-
ated by federal law . . . .”); Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 808 (1988) (“A 
district court’s federal-question jurisdiction, we recently explained, extends over only those cases in 
which a well-pleaded complaint establishes . . . that federal law creates the cause of action.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63 (1987) (same); Franchise Tax 
Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 27–28 (1983) (same).  
119  Am. Well Works, 241 U.S. 257. 
120  See Stoneridge Inv. Part., LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 165 (2008) (“The de-
termination of who can seek a remedy has significant consequences for the reach of federal power.”); 
Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 746 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) (“By creating a private ac-
tion, a court of limited jurisdiction necessarily extends its authority to embrace a dispute Congress has 
not assigned it to resolve.”). 
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pensing with this understanding removes the heart of the tribunals position.  
In a previous piece, I lay out the case for both of these propositions in 
greater detail;121 while I cannot fully reargue these positions here, I rely 
upon a few examples to illustrate my views. 
a. Section 1331 as mere assertion of federal cause of action.—I 
begin with the erroneous notion that the Holmes test requires plaintiffs to 
establish a federal cause of action in order to vest § 1331 jurisdiction.  The 
tribunals position relies upon this notion.  For example, Justice Powell ar-
gued that the  
power [to construe legislation] normally is exercised with respect to disputes 
over which a court already has jurisdiction, and in which the existence of  the 
asserted cause of action is established.  Implication of a private cause of ac-
tion, in contrast, involves a significant additional step. . . .  [because] a court of 
limited jurisdiction necessarily extends its authority to embrace a dispute Con-
gress has not assigned it to resolve.122   
The Holmes test, however, does not require that plaintiffs actually es-
tablish a federal cause of action in order to vest § 1331 jurisdiction.  The 
Justice Powell propostion is an error that “frequently happens where juris-
diction depends on subject matter.”123  The error lies because “the question 
[of] whether jurisdiction exists has been confused with the question [of] 
whether the complaint states a cause of action.”124  But error it is.125  Indeed, 
the assertion-only reading of the Holmes test is so ingrained that Justice 
Scalia espouses it from time to time in cases where the question of inferring 
a cause of action is not squarely before the Court.126  The tribunals posi-
 
  
121  Lumen N. Mulligan, A Unified Theory of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 Jurisdiction, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1667 
(2008). 
122  Cannon, 441 U.S. at 745–46 (Powell, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted); see also Bell v. Hood, 
327 U.S. 678, 686 (1946) (Stone, C.J. dissenting) (when the federal statutory or constitutional provision 
in question does not “afford[] a remedy to any person, the mere assertion by a plaintiff that he is entitled 
to such a remedy cannot be said to satisfy jurisdictional requirements”). 
123  Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 359 (1959) (quoting Mont.-Dakota Utils. 
Co. v. Nw. Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246, 249 (1951)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
124  Id. 
125  See, e.g., Mulligan, supra note 121, at 1691–1703 (reviewing § 1331 cases involving congres-
sionally created causes of action and concluding, inter alia, that a plaintiff need only assert—not estab-
lish—the cause of action); see also supra note 43 (listing cases holding that successful establishment of 
a federal cause of action is not required under the Holmes test). 
126  See, e.g., Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 642–43 (2002) (Scalia, 
J.) (“It is firmly established in our cases that the absence of a valid (as opposed to arguable) cause of ac-
tion does not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction, i.e., the courts’ statutory or constitutional power to 
adjudicate the case.” (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) (Scalia, J.) 
(not reaching the inference question))); see also id. at 644 (noting that the statute in question “reads like 
the conferral of a private right of action”). 
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tion’s insistence that a plaintiff establish127—as opposed to merely assert—a 
federal cause of action, then, runs counter to run-of-the-mill jurisdictional 
practice under the Holmes test. 
This conclusion, however, could be construed by a proponent of the 
tribunals position as merely begging the question.  In essence, I assert that 
standard understandings of the Holmes test are not compatible with the tri-
bunals position.  Of course, the tribunals position rejects the standard 
view—that’s the point.128  Proponents of the tribunals position could well 
argue that the better understanding of the Holmes test requires not merely 
an assertion of a federal cause of action, but an actual showing that the 
cause of action is extant.129  I take up this rebuttal by rejecting the Holmes 
test altogether. 
b. Section 1331 as rights, not causes of action.—I turn now to 
challenge this key assumption of the tribunals position: namely, that the 
Holmes test accurately describes the Court’s § 1331 doctrine.  Contrary to 
the Holmes test, the existence of a federal cause of action (i.e., the determi-
nation that a person falls into a class of litigants empowered to vindicate a 
specified right in court)130 is neither a necessary131 nor sufficient132 condition 
for the vesting of § 1331 jurisdiction.133  Under the analysis of § 1331 juris-
diction I advocate, the Court takes § 1331 jurisdiction based upon the fed-
eral origin of the right (i.e., clearly stated, mandatory, judicially enforceable 
obligation)134 asserted.  The origin of the cause of action, under my view, is 
not outcome determinative—contrary to the terms of the Holmes test.  Ra-
 
  
127  The Court does require a “showing” of a federal cause of action under certain extreme circum-
stances not relevant here.  See Mulligan, supra note 121, at 1712–24 (arguing that the Court employs 
this more restrictive jurisdictional standard only in certain categories of federal common law suits). 
128  Cf. supra note 43 (listing cases espousing the standard view). 
129  See Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 746 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).  
130  See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239 n.18 (1979) (“[A] cause of action is a question of 
whether a particular plaintiff is a member of the class of litigants that may, as a matter of law, appropri-
ately invoke the power of the court.”). 
131  See, e.g., Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005); 
Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 201–02 (1921).  
132  See, e.g., Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 605, 607–12 (1979); Baker v. 
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 187, 218–29 (1962); Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505, 507, 513 (1900). 
133  See Mulligan, supra note 121, at 1724–25 (providing a summary of this view). 
134  See Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 431–32 (1987) 
(holding that, to be a “right,” an obligation must not be vague or “beyond the competence of the judici-
ary to enforce”); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 24 (1981) (holding that, to be 
a “right,” an obligation must be mandatory as opposed to merely hortatory); see also Passman, 442 U.S. 
at 241 (defining “right”).  This tripartite test (viz., mandatory obligation, clear statement, and enforce-
ability) remains the standard by which the Court determines when a federal right exists.  See Gonzaga 
Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284 (2002); Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 341–42 (1997); Livadas v. 
Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 132–33 (1994); Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 363 (1992); Wilder v. Va. 
Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 509–10 (1990); Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of L.A., 493 U.S. 103, 
106 (1989). 
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Rather, under my view, the assertion of a federal statutory cause of action 
acts only as added indicia of congressional intent to vest jurisdiction in the 
federal courts, allowing plaintiffs to plead merely a “colorable” federal right 
in such suits.135  The absence of a congressionally created cause of action, 
by contrast, does not absolutely bar § 1331 jurisdiction, but plaintiffs in 
such suits must plead the federal right at issue more vigorously.136  I rely on 
a few examples here to illustrate my view, leaving the more nuanced dis-
cussion of my anti-Holmes-test stance to my previous work.137 
 First, the existence of a federal cause of action is not sufficient for the 
vesting of § 1331 jurisdiction.  For example, the Court refuses to take 
§ 1331 jurisdiction over cases involving state law rights, even when Con-
gress creates a federal cause of action to enforce them.138  In Shoshone Min-
ing Co. v. Rutter, for instance, the Court addressed a statute in which 
Congress authorized suits to adjudicate competing claims to mining 
rights.139  The act, however, stated that state or territorial law would deter-
mine the outcome of the claims.140  Thus, the case presented a situation 
where state law created the right, but Congress created the cause of action.  
The issue for the Court was whether the mining act created federal question 
jurisdiction for the adjudication of these state law rights.  A straightforward 
application of the Holmes test would have found jurisdiction, due to the 
federal origin of the cause of action.  Nevertheless, the Court refused juris-
diction under § 1331 because “the right of possession may not involve any 
question as to the construction . . . of the . . . laws of the United States, but 
may present simply . . . a determination of . . . local rules . . . or the effect of 
state statutes.”141  Thus, despite the dictates of the Holmes test, the Court 
held that a congressionally created cause of action to enforce state law 
rights does not arise under § 1331.142 
 
  
135  See Mulligan, supra note 121, at 1726 (“These two components—the federal right and cause of 
action—work in a teeter-totter manner in relation to congressional intent.  That is to say, when there are 
other strong indicia of congressional intent to vest § 1331 jurisdiction such as the existence of a statutory 
cause of action, the plaintiff’s assertion of a federal right may be quite weak.  Conversely, when there 
are few other congressional indicia of an intent to vest § 1331 jurisdiction, the plaintiff must make a 
stronger allegation of a federal right in order for § 1331 jurisdiction to lie.”). 
136  See id. at 1725–26 (noting that federal rights coupled with state law causes of action must be 
pleaded pursuant to the more vigorous “substantial” standard and so-called pure federal common law 
causes of action must be coupled with actual showings that the federal right applies). 
137  See generally id. at 1685–1726 (arguing across numerous categories of suits that the Holmes test 
does not describe the Court’s § 1331 practice). 
138  Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U.S. 476, 483 (1933); Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 
U.S. 505, 507 (1900); Mulligan, supra note 121, at 1687–89. 
139  177 U.S. at 506. 
140  Id. at 508. 
141  Id. at 509. 
142  For another case that refused federal question jurisdiction, a federal cause of action notwith-
standing, see Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561 (1912), which held that equitable quiet title actions, 
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In Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., the Court clearly held that, despite the 
Holmes test, the focus for § 1331 jurisdiction is the assertion of a federal 
right—not a federal cause of action.143  Here Puerto Rico sought to collect a 
tax debt in court, due to a federal statute that required the collection of such 
claims by a suit at law, as opposed to an attachment proceeding, and had 
created a cause of action to do so.144  Puerto Rico began a suit at law in the 
Puerto Rican courts to collect the tax.145  The defendant removed to federal 
district court, relying upon the Holmes test, contending that the case arose 
under § 1331.146  The Court disagreed.  Federal question jurisdiction, the 
Court held, may only be “invoked to vindicate a right or privilege claimed 
under a federal statute.  It may not be invoked where the right asserted is 
nonfederal, merely because the plaintiff’s right to sue is derived from fed-
eral law.”147  Reinforcing the point, the Court stated that “[t]he federal na-
ture of the right to be established is decisive [for jurisdictional purposes]—
not the source of the authority to establish it.”148  Although the rhetoric of 
the Holmes test commands contemporary judicial discussion of § 1331 ju-
risdiction,149 the rights-focused approach I advocate presents a better picture 
of the Court’s actual practice.150 
Further reinforcing that the nature of the federal right, not the origin of 
the cause of action, determines § 1331 jurisdiction, the Court refuses to hear 
                                                                                                                              
although congressionally approved causes of action, lack statutory federal question jurisdiction when the 
right to the land in question is controlled by state law.  Id. at 569–70. 
143  288 U.S. at 483–84. 
144  Id. 
145  Id. at 477. 
146  Id. 
147  Id. at 483. 
148  Id. 
149  See, e.g., Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005) 
(“This provision for federal question jurisdiction is invoked by and large by plaintiffs pleading a cause 
of action created by federal law . . . .”); City of Chi. v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 163 (1997) 
(“It is long settled law that a cause of action arises under federal law only when the plaintiff’s well-
pleaded complaint raises issues of federal law.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Chris-
tianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 808 (1988) (“A district court’s federal question 
jurisdiction, we recently explained, extends over only those cases in which a well-pleaded complaint es-
tablishes . . . that federal law creates the cause of action . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Me-
tro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63 (1987) (“It is long settled law that a cause of action arises 
under federal law only when the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint raises issues of federal law.”).  
150  See, e.g., Grable & Sons, 545 U.S. at 317 n.5; Jackson Transit Auth. v. Transit Union, 457 U.S. 
15, 29 (1982) (holding that the federal courts lack § 1331 jurisdiction over claims under the Urban Mass 
Transportation Act because Congress instructs that these rights are to be determined by state law); Bay 
Shore Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Kain, 485 F.3d 730, 735 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that the federal courts 
lacked § 1331 jurisdiction because although the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act empowered 
the plaintiff to sue the rights at issue were entirely a matter of state law); City Nat’l Bank v. Edmisten, 
681 F.2d 942, 945 (4th Cir. 1982) (holding that the National Bank Act “is not a sufficient basis for fed-
eral question jurisdiction simply because it incorporates state law” when the act makes usury, as defined 
by local state law, illegal and the nondiverse parties were only contesting the meaning of North Caro-
lina’s usury law). 
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cases under § 1331 concerning merely procedural federal rights, even when 
coupled with a federal cause of action such as 42 U.S.C § 1983.151  While 
§ 1983 creates a statutory cause of action for the violation of federal rights 
by state officials, it does not create rights; rather, it merely empowers a 
class of persons to enforce federal rights located in the Constitution or other 
statutes.152  Thus, § 1983 cases present instances where the existence of a 
congressionally created cause of action is not in question; only the validity 
of the federal right asserted is at issue.  A straightforward application of the 
Holmes test, of course, would take jurisdiction over any federal cause of ac-
tion, even to enforce procedural rights.  Thus, when a plaintiff attempts to 
use the All Writs Act,153 a choice of law statute,154 or a rule of procedure155 
to vest jurisdiction, the federal courts will not find § 1331 jurisdiction.  Si-
milarly, the Court holds that it lacks jurisdiction to hear claims where the 
underlying rights derive from the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Con-
stitution.156  This is the case, the Court ruled, because the clause does not 
create substantive rights, but rather provides a res judicata rule (i.e., a pro-
cedural rule) for state courts.157  The Court applies the same reasoning to 
suits brought to enforce the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, even 
 
  
151  Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32 (2002) (“[The removal statute] requires 
that a federal court have original jurisdiction over an action in order for it to be removed from a state 
court.  The All Writs Act, alone or in combination with the existence of ancillary jurisdiction in a federal 
court, is not a substitute for that requirement.”); Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 
600, 618 (1979) (finding that § 1983 can be used to show that an action is “authorized by law,” but that 
the act itself does not “provide any rights at all”); see also Mulligan, supra note 121, at 1686, 1725–26 
(outlining my rights-focused, unified approach to § 1331 jurisdiction).  
152  Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 404 (2001) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“Section 1983 creates no 
new substantive rights; it merely provides a federal cause of action for the violation of federal rights that 
are independently established either in the Federal Constitution or in federal statutory law.” (citation 
omitted)). 
153  See, e.g., Syngenta, 537 U.S. at 32, 34. 
154  See, e.g., Rogers v. Platt, 814 F.2d 683, 689 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that the Parental Kidnap-
ping Prevention Act does not create colorable rights, but rather provides a choice of law rule and as such 
the court lacks jurisdiction). 
155  See, e.g., Palkow v. CSX Transp., Inc., 431 F.3d 543, 555 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Merely invoking the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [Rule 60] is not sufficient grounds to establish federal question juris-
diction.”); Milan Express, Inc. v. Averitt Express, Inc., 208 F.3d 975, 979 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding in 
regard to Rule 65.1 that a “federal rule cannot be the basis of original jurisdiction”); Cresswell v. Sulli-
van & Cromwell, 922 F.2d 60, 70 (2d Cir. 1990) (“The Rules do not provide an independent ground for 
subject matter jurisdiction over an action for which there is no other basis for jurisdiction.”); Port Drum 
Co. v. Umphrey, 852 F.2d 148, 150 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding the court lacks jurisdiction to hear a suit 
directly under Rule 11).   
156  Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 182 (1988); Minnesota v. N. Sec. Co., 194 U.S. 48, 72 
(1904).  
157  Thompson, 484 U.S. at 182–83 (“Rather, the Clause only prescribes a rule by which courts, Fed-
eral and state, are to be guided when a question arises in the progress of a pending suit as to the faith and 
credit to be given by the court to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of a State other than 
that in which the court is sitting.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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when Congress supplies a federal cause of action.158  As the Court noted in 
Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, the “Clause is not a 
source of any federal rights,” but rather a choice of law rule for cases of 
conflict between state and federal law.159  Again, the plaintiff’s lack of sub-
stantive rights forms the linchpin to the Court’s jurisdictional ruling, not the 
origin of the cause of action as the Holmes test suggests.  
Moreover, contrary to the Holmes test, a federal cause of action is not a 
necessary condition for § 1331 jurisdiction.160  The Court takes § 1331 ju-
risdiction over cases asserting substantive federal rights even when coupled 
with state law causes of action.161  The lead case is Smith v. Kansas City Ti-
tle & Trust Co.162  In Smith, a stockholder sued in federal court to enjoin his 
corporation from purchasing bonds issued pursuant to the Federal Farm 
Loan Act.163  The plaintiff argued that such a purchase would constitute a 
breach of fiduciary duty—a state law cause of action—because the corpora-
tion could only purchase bonds “authorized to be issued by a valid law” and 
that the Federal Farm Loan Act was unconstitutional.164  Although the plain-
tiff pursued a state law cause of action, the Court held that “where it ap-
pears from the bill or statement of the plaintiff that the right to relief 
depends upon the construction or application of the Constitution . . . and 
that such federal claim is not merely colorable, . . . the District Court has ju-
risdiction under this provision.”165  In so doing, the Court found that a plain-
tiff could avail himself of a federal forum on a state law theory of recovery 
under § 1331, because the plaintiff’s state law cause of action necessarily 
required the court to pass upon the constitutionality of a federal act.166  The 
Court recently reaffirmed the Smith-style jurisdiction in Grable & Sons 
Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing.167  
 
  
158  See, e.g., Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 612–15 (1979) (holding that 
there is no federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) for a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim alleg-
ing a violation of the Supremacy Clause); Virgin v. County of San Luis Obispo, 201 F.3d 1141, 1144–
45 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that a plaintiff does not have a cause of action directly under the Supremacy 
Clause and that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 as a result). 
159  441 U.S. at 613. 
160  See, e.g., T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 827 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J.) (Holmes test 
is a rule of inclusion); see also Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 9 
(1983) (same and quoting T.B. Harms). 
161  See, e.g., Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005); 
Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 199 (1921); see also Mulligan, supra note 121, at 
1698–1701, 1711–12 (discussing Grable and Smith). 
162  Smith, 255 U.S. 180; see also Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 319–22 (1936) 
(taking jurisdiction over a state law fiduciary duty case which presented an embedded constitutional 
challenge); Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 659–60 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (similar). 
163  255 U.S. at 195. 
164  Id. at 198. 
165  Id. at 199. 
166  Id. at 201–02. 
167  545 U.S. 308, 308 (2005).  See infra Part I.B.2 (discussing Grable in greater detail).  
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As this sampling of the Court’s cases demonstrates, contrary to the 
Holmes test, it is the federal origin of the substantive right asserted, not the 
origin of the cause of action, that is the key concept in determining whether 
a case arises under § 1331.168  The Court’s Russell & Co. opinion best re-
flects this view of the § 1331 doctrine: “The federal nature of the right to be 
established is decisive [in determining federal question jurisdiction]—not 
the source of the authority to establish it.”169  Although the origin of the 
cause of action affects the vigor with which a substantive federal right must 
be pled, the essential jurisdictional determinate under § 1331 is the asser-
tion of a substantive federal right.170 
This more accurate understanding of how § 1331 jurisdiction operates 
has much purchase in refuting the argument that inferring a cause of action 
is extrajurisdictional.  Recall that in inferred cause of action cases there is 
little argument that the statutory provision in question does not create a 
right.  Instead, the issue before the Court in these cases is whether the plain-
tiff is a member of a class of persons entitled to seek judicial enforcement 
of the right (i.e., whether the plaintiff has a cause of action).171  Given that 
the existence of a substantive federal right is not in question in these cases, 
and that it is the assertion of the federal substantive right that is the essential 
jurisdictional trigger for § 1331, the act of inferring a cause of action does 
not expand the jurisdiction of the federal courts.  Thus, it is Congress, ab-
sent a clear statement to the contrary,172 that expands § 1331 when it creates 
a right, not the judiciary when it infers a cause of action.173  The courts’ lat-
ter determination of whether a cause of action lies, while of great impor-
tance to the success of the suit, is not a decision of a jurisdictional nature.  
2. Hybrid Actions as a Problem.—In a related difficulty for the tri-
bunals position, the federal courts are empowered to take § 1331 jurisdic-
tion over hybrid claims.  The inferred cause of action is a regular feature of 
 
  
168  Mulligan, supra note 121, at 1725 (“[T]he primary determinate for the vesting of § 1331 juris-
diction is the status of the federal right asserted.”). 
169  288 U.S. 476, 483 (1933).  
170  Mulligan, supra note 121, at 1725–26 (summarizing the view that the origin of the cause of ac-
tion is not outcome determinative of § 1331 jurisdiction, but it does affect the standard to which the 
plaintiff must plead the federal right invoked). 
171  See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239 n.18 (1979) (defining cause of action along these 
lines). 
172  See infra notes 298–300 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s strong presumption that 
newly adopted federal statutory rights concomitantly vest the federal courts with § 1331 jurisdiction ab-
sent a clear statement to the contrary). 
173  See Wasserman, supra note 95, at 677–78 (“The significance of statutory general federal ques-
tion jurisdiction is that when Congress enacts a substantive law, federal district courts immediately and 
necessarily attain jurisdiction to hear claims under that statute, without Congress having to do anything 
more.”).  Of course, this only follows when one discusses statutory, not constitutional, federal question 
jurisdiction.  If there were not a well established series of lower federal courts, such a presumption may 
well be unsound. 
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state tort law, often bearing the moniker of negligence per se.174  Under 
standard tort doctrine, the breach of a state law statutory duty that lacks a 
statutory cause of action may be remedied by using the statutory breach as a 
means of establishing breach of duty of care in a negligence or other com-
mon law cause of action.175  Moreover, federal statutory176 and constitu-
tional177 rights are often coupled with state common law causes of action in 
just this way.178  In these so-called hybrid actions, a federal statutory duty is 
employed as the standard of care within the context of a state law cause of 
action.179  Importantly for this discussion, when a plaintiff couples a federal 
right with a state law cause of action in this manner, the case may arise un-
der § 1331 federal question jurisdiction.  
 
  
174  See Zeigler, Integrated Approach, supra note 4, at 75 (“During the late 1800s and early 1900s, 
American state courts routinely allowed private remedies for violations of statutes containing other sanc-
tions, although sometimes on a slightly different legal theory.  Violation of a statute was said to consti-
tute ‘evidence of negligence’ or ‘negligence per se.’”); accord Foy, supra note 19, at 542. 
175  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 286 (1965) (providing basic negligence per se rule). 
176  See, e.g., Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 311–12 
(2005) (applying IRS standard in a quiet title action); Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 
804, 805–07 (1986) (seeking to use federal FDA standard in a negligence per se action); Vinnick v. Del-
ta Airlines, Inc., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 471, 481 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (“[The] negligence per se standard can 
be applied to a violation of federal standards . . . .”); Coker v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 642 So. 2d 774, 
776, 778 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that a violation of the federal Gun Control Act can amount 
to negligence per se); Lohmann ex rel. Lohmann v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 948 S.W.2d 659, 672 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1997) (noting that the plaintiff could argue “negligence per se in failing to comply with federal 
regulations”).  But see Lugo v. St. Nicholas Assocs., 772 N.Y.S.2d 449, 454–55 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003) 
(“[T]he ADA does not create a private cause of action for damages for its violation.  If mere proof of a 
violation of the ADA were to establish negligence per se, plaintiff would effectively be afforded a pri-
vate cause of action that the ADA does not recognize.  The court accordingly holds that proof of a viola-
tion of the ADA may only constitute evidence of negligence, not negligence per se.”). 
177  See, e.g., Ex parte Duvall, 782 So. 2d 244, 248 (Ala. 2000) (holding state law torts of assault, 
unlawful arrest, false imprisonment and conspiracy barred as a matter of law because the police officer 
met the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause standard when detaining the plaintiff); Renk v. City of 
Pittsburgh, 641 A.2d 289, 293 (Pa. 1994) (a plaintiff alleging false imprisonment must show that a de-
fendant’s actions were unlawful, which often amounts to whether a defendant acting under color of law 
had probable cause); Susag v. City of Lake Forest, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 269, 278–79 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) 
(holding that the plaintiff’s state law claims of battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and 
false imprisonment failed as a matter of law because the plaintiff “did not meet his burden of producing 
evidence showing [the defendants] used physical force against or exerted authority over him that re-
sulted in a ‘seizure’ under the Fourth Amendment”). 
178  Pauline E. Calande, Note, State Incorporation of Federal Law: A Response to the Demise of Im-
plied Federal Rights of Action, 94 YALE L.J. 1144, 1144 (1985) (“[T]hus even when implied federal 
rights of action have been denied, states may often be able to provide a right of action to private plain-
tiffs by creating a parallel state law that incorporates federal law by reference.”). 
179  John F. Preis, Jurisdiction and Discretion in Hybrid Cases, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 145, 161–62 
(2006) (finding in an empirical review of court of appeals cases over a nearly twenty-year period that 
almost 39% of hybrid cases “appear as tort actions where the federal law defines a standard of care to be 
observed”). 
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Again, Smith is the starting point.180  Recall that in Smith the Court held 
§ 1331 jurisdiction appropriate over a state law cause of action because the 
claim had an embedded federal constitutional right at issue.181  Thus, even if 
the inference of a cause of action from a federal statute were extrajurisdic-
tional, in what amounts to the same practical result, a hybrid suit where 
state law provides the cause of action to vindicate a federal right permits a 
federal court to take § 1331 jurisdiction under Smith.  
Justice Powell recognized as much in his Cannon dissent.182  Citing 
Smith, Justice Powell found it “instructive to compare decisions implying 
private causes of action to those cases that have found nonfederal causes of 
action cognizable by a federal court under § 1331.”183  He agreed with the 
notion that “the net effect [of bringing a hybrid claim under Smith] is the 
same as implication of a private action directly from the constitutional or 
statutory source of the federal law elements.”184  As a result, Justice Powell 
concluded that hybrid actions such as Smith are extrajurisdictional in just 
the same manner as the inference of a federal cause of action.185 
In 1986, the Court flirted with the notion that bringing a hybrid action 
under § 1331 was jurisdictionally barred unless congressional intent could 
be found to justify an inference of a cause of action directly from the fed-
eral statute in question.  In Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, 
the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant’s pharmaceutical product caused a 
birth defect.186  They brought a state law negligence per se action, using an 
alleged breach of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act as proof of the 
breach of duty.187  The defendant sought to remove the case to federal court 
under a Smith theory of § 1331 jurisdiction. 188  Of importance, all the par-
ties and the circuit court below agreed that there was no federal cause of ac-
tion, inferred or otherwise.189  The Court went on to state that the 
“significance . . . that there is no federal private cause of action . . . cannot 
be overstated.”190  The Court stated that to infer a cause of action here, 
which would run contrary to congressional intent, would be impermissible.  
The Court continued: 
 
  
180  255 U.S. 180 (1921).  See also Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 319–22 (1936) 
(taking jurisdiction over a state law fiduciary duty case which presented an embedded constitutional 
challenge to a corporate purchase of electricity from the TVA). 
181  255 U.S. at 199.  
182  441 U.S. 677, 746 n.17 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
183  Id. 
184  Id. 
185  Id 
186  478 U.S. 804, 805 (1986).  
187  Id. at 805–06.   
188  Id. at 806.   
189  Id. at 810 (“In this case, both parties agree with the Court of Appeals’s conclusion that there is 
no federal cause of action for FDCA violations.”). 
190  Id. at 812. 
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[I]t would similarly flout, or at least undermine, congressional intent to con-
clude that the federal courts might nevertheless exercise federal question juris-
diction and provide remedies for violations of that federal statute solely 
because the violation of the federal statute is said to be a “rebuttable presump-
tion” or a “proximate cause” under state law, rather than a federal action under 
federal law.191  
For the next twenty years, many courts of appeals, believing this argu-
ment to constitute the holding in Merrell Dow, held that the existence of a 
federal private right of action was the definitive factor for divining congres-
sional intent on the propriety of taking federal question jurisdiction over 
hybrid claims.192  Thus, Justice Powell’s view was taking root. 
The Court, however, recently clarified its Merrell Dow opinion.  In 
Grable & Sons v. Darue Engineering, the IRS seized real property belong-
ing to Grable & Sons to satisfy a federal tax deficiency and sold the prop-
erty to Darue Engineering.193  Five years later, Grable & Sons sued Darue 
Engineering in state court to quiet title, a state law cause of action.194  Gra-
ble & Sons asserted that Darue Engineering’s title was invalid because the 
IRS had conveyed the seizure notice to Grable & Sons in violation of the 
Internal Revenue Code governing such actions.195  The Supreme Court af-
firmed federal question jurisdiction in the case because the plaintiff’s state 
law cause of action necessarily depended upon a claim of a substantive fed-
eral right.196  In so holding, the Court specifically rejected the notion that a 
federal court may only take § 1331 jurisdiction over hybrid claims if the 
court could have inferred a federal cause of action.197   
Grable & Sons presents a difficult problem for the tribunals position.  
On the one hand, if “the net effect [of bringing a hybrid claim under Smith] 
is the same as implication of a private action directly from . . . [a federal] 
constitutional or statutory source,”198 as Justice Powell contends, then Gra-
ble & Sons, which upheld taking jurisdiction over a hybrid case, is a 
strong—perhaps overwhelming—precedent weighing against the tribunals 
position.  On the other hand, if hybrid actions and inferred federal causes of 
action are not essentially the same jurisdictional animal, a jurisdictional ban 
 
  
191  Id. 
192  See Note, Mr. Smith Goes to Federal Court: Federal Question Jurisdiction over State Law 
Claims Post-Merrell Dow, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2272, 2280–82 (2002) [hereinafter Mr. Smith] (discuss-
ing the split in Courts of Appeals over the private cause of action requirement after Merrell Dow). 
193  545 U.S. 308, 310–11 (2005). 
194  Id. 
195  Id. (Grable & Sons maintained that the IRS failed to comply with the notice procedures of 26 
U.S.C. § 6335(a)). 
196  Id. at 316. 
197  Id. at 318 (“Accordingly, Merrell Dow should be read in its entirety as treating the absence of a 
federal private right of action as evidence relevant to, but not dispositive of, the ‘sensitive judgments 
about congressional intent’ that § 1331 requires.”). 
198  Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 746 n.17 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
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upon the inference of a federal cause of action would have little real world 
effect, as plaintiffs would merely file hybrid actions and seek federal juris-
diction under the Smith test. 
An advocate of the tribunals position would likely retort that the sec-
ond horn of this dilemma is stated too strongly.  The jurisdictional standard 
crafted for hybrid claims is significantly more restrictive than the typical ju-
risdictional standard employed under § 1331.199  In Grable & Sons, the 
Court went to pains to distinguish the “substantial” and “serious” claim to a 
congressionally created right, which is necessary to establish § 1331 juris-
diction when a state law cause of action is asserted, from mere colorable as-
sertions of a congressionally created right, which typically ground § 1331 
jurisdiction.200  The Court stressed that in a hybrid claim the federal right at 
issue must be the central and predominant question in the case.201  Further, 
the Court emphasized that in a hybrid case the legal content of the statutory 
right invoked must be actually contested by the parties.202  Finally, the Court 
specifically considered whether taking jurisdiction in the case comported 
with congressional intent regarding the division of labor between the state 
and federal courts.203  Given this heightened standard, one should expect 
hybrid jurisdiction to remain a “special and small category” of § 1331 juris-
diction,204 which undercuts the force of the assertion that hybrid action cases 
are jurisdictionally interchangeable with inferred cause of action cases. 
This rebuttal is surely correct—as far as it goes.  Adopting the view 
that the inference of a federal cause of action is extrajurisdictional would, in 
 
  
199  See Mulligan, supra note 121, at 1699–1701. 
200  See, e.g., Grable & Sons, 545 U.S. at 313 (“It has in fact become a constant refrain in such cases 
that federal jurisdiction demands not only a contested federal issue, but a substantial one, indicating a 
serious federal interest in claiming the advantages thought to be inherent in a federal forum.”).  
201  Id. 
202  Id. 
203  To be clear, the Court treats the substantial right factor as necessary, but not sufficient, for find-
ing § 1331 jurisdiction.  Id. at 318–19.  It also requires a finding that jurisdiction “is consistent with 
congressional judgment about the sound division of labor between state and federal courts governing the 
application of § 1331.”  Id. at 313–14.  There are lower court examples of this specific finding of con-
gressional intent.  See Broder v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 418 F.3d 187, 194−96 (2d Cir. 2005) (applying 
Grable & Sons and taking jurisdiction over a state law contract claim that required construction of fed-
eral cable television law, because taking this jurisdiction would not upset the flow of litigation in state 
and federal courts); Municipality of San Juan v. Corporación Para El Fomento Económico De La Ciudad 
Capital, 415 F.3d 145, 148 n.6 (1st Cir. 2005) (applying Grable & Sons and taking jurisdiction over a 
state law contract claim that required construction of HUD regulations); see also Martin H. Redish, Re-
assessing the Allocation of Judicial Business Between State and Federal Courts: Federal Jurisdiction 
and “The Martian Chronicles,” 78 VA. L. REV. 1769, 1793 (1992) (arguing that federal question juris-
diction over hybrid claims should lie to “increase the level of state-federal judicial interchange in the 
shaping and development of the relevant federal statute”); Mr. Smith, supra note 192, at 2292–93 (argu-
ing that by incorporating federal law “a state might be understood to have waived its claim to exclusive 
jurisdiction over a violation of the hybrid law”).  
204  See, e.g., Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 699 (2006) (declining 
to take hybrid jurisdiction under Grable & Sons). 
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fact, have a real-world effect on those seeking to enforce federal rights that 
lack explicit causes of action in a federal court.  But the effect is not to bar 
the federal courthouse door outright, only to make it harder to open.  If 
these federal right-holders are relegated to hybrid actions, they may still ob-
tain a federal forum,205 even though it will be more difficult to do so than is 
typically the case under § 1331.206 
3. The Greater Power of Federal Common Law.—If the rights-
focused theory for taking § 1331 jurisdiction I advocate demonstrates a ju-
risdictional defect, it lies in the Court’s federal common law doctrine—not 
in the practice of inferring causes of action.207  It is informative, in this re-
gard, to distinguish federal common law from the practice of inferring caus-
es of action.  This distinction is not cheaply made, however.  
There are at least three views on the subject, with the broadest notion 
encompassing the practice of inferring causes of action as an element of 
federal common law.208  The narrowest view finds that federal common law 
is merely a listing of those enclaves where the Court has employed federal 
common law in the past.209  On the broad side, federal common law is 
thought by some to include “any rule of federal law created by a 
court . . . when the substance of that rule is not clearly suggested by federal 
enactments—constitutional or congressional.”210  This broad view would 
encompass many actions, such as inferring causes of actions from statutes 
or the Constitution, often not traditionally considered components of federal 
common law.211  I employ the more common definition of federal common 
 
  
205  See Lumen N. Mulligan, Why Bivens Won’t Die: The Legacy of Peoples v. CCA Detention Cen-
ters, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 685, 709–15 (2006) (discussing the use of federal law as the standard of duty 
to gain federal jurisdiction over negligence per se cases). 
206  Mulligan, supra note 121, at 1726 (discussing the heightened jurisdictional standard applied to 
hybrid cases).  
207  Id. at 1717–25, 1735–40 (discussing the ultra-restrictive jurisdictional approach the Court em-
ploys for taking § 1331 jurisdiction over pure federal common law claims). 
208  See Jay Tidmarsh & Brian J. Murray, A Theory of Federal Common Law, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 
585, 590–94 (2006). 
209  Id. at 593. 
210  Field, supra note 24, at 890. 
211  See Tidmarsh & Murray, supra note 208, at 594.  Indeed, such a view of federal common law 
would wreak havoc on the reinterpretation of § 1331 doctrine I present here.  When taken to its logical 
conclusion, this broad view finds no meaningful distinction between federal common law and other ju-
dicial acts of interstitial lawmaking.  See Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 
805, 807 (1989); Peter Westen & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Is There Life for Erie After the Death of Diversity?, 
78 MICH. L. REV. 311, 332 (1980) (“The difference between ‘common law’ and ‘statutory interpreta-
tion’ is a difference in emphasis rather than a difference in kind.  The more definite and explicit the pre-
vailing legislative policy, the more likely a court will describe its lawmaking as statutory interpretation; 
the less precise and less explicit the perceived legislative policy, the more likely a court will speak of 
common law.  The distinction, however, is entirely one of degree.”).  Thus, at least for this jurisdictional 
project, the expansive view is inappropriate because the Court does appear to differentiate between 
statutory and constitutional claims (i.e., those involving interpretation) on the one hand, and federal 
common law cases (i.e., those employing legislative authority) on the other.  Further, whether it makes 
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law in my discussion,212 which defines federal common law as “federal rules 
of decision whose content cannot be traced by traditional methods of inter-
pretation to federal statutory or constitutional commands.”213  The standard 
view of federal common law, then, excludes the practice of inferring a 
cause of action for two reasons.  First, the decision of whether to infer a 
cause of action, as the Court in the Touche Ross era makes clear, is primar-
ily a function of legislative intent.214  The decision to craft a federal com-
mon law, by contrast, does not rest primarily upon legislative intent.215  
Thus, these are fundamentally distinct endeavors—one a species of divining 
congressional intent, the other an independent weighing of competing poli-
cies.  Second, the judicial inference of a cause of action does not entail the 
judicial creation of a right, because by definition all such cases are those in 
which the federal right is already extant.  The judicial creation of a right in 
federal common law cases, moreover, carries with it serious separation of 
powers216 and federalism issues217 not as prominent in the inferred cause of 
action context. 
                                                                                                                              
sense or not, the courts continually assert that inferring a cause of action from a statute or the Constitu-
tion is a different task than creating federal common law.  See, e.g., Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Work-
ers Union of Am., 451 U.S. 77, 97 (1981) (“But the authority to construe a statute is fundamentally 
different from the authority to fashion a new rule or to provide a new remedy which Congress has de-
cided not to adopt.”). 
212  Tidmarsh & Murray, supra note 208, at 590–91. 
213  RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM 685 (5th ed. 2003). 
214  See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979) (“The question of the existence 
of a statutory cause of action is, of course, one of statutory construction.”).  The Court has reiterated this 
sentiment often in the Touche Ross era.  See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001); Va. 
Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1102 (1991); Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 
U.S. 804, 812 n.9 (1986); Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 535–36 (1984); Middlesex 
County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 13 (1981).  
215  See, e.g., O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 89 (1994) (holding that the weighing of 
factors in the proposed creation of federal common law is more appropriately a legislative function); 
Nw. Airlines, 451 U.S. at 98 n.41 (same); Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 
U.S. 448, 457 (1957) (holding that in fashioning federal common law “[t]he range of judicial inventive-
ness will be determined by the nature of the problem”). 
216  See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 99–100 (1972) (holding that federal decisional 
law is properly “law” under § 1331); Mulligan, supra note 121, at 1716–17 (outlining in more detail the 
jurisdictional—and thus separation of powers—implications for the creation of rights as a matter of fed-
eral common law); Tidmarsh & Murray, supra note 208, at 653 (“[A] federal common law claim creates 
federal jurisdiction.”); cf. Glen Staszewski, Avoiding Absurdity, 81 IND. L.J. 1001, 1035 (2006) (argu-
ing, in regard to equal protection claims, that recognizing certain “actionable federal constitutional 
claims would dramatically expand the jurisdiction of federal courts”).  Congress retains broad control of 
the jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts, and it may grant a narrower scope of subject matter juris-
diction than is found in Article III.  See supra note 104 and accompanying text.  
217  See, e.g., Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 218 (1997) (holding that because federal common 
law displaces state law, such issues properly are matters of congressional concern); O’Melveny & Myers, 
512 U.S. at 83 (rejecting the federal common law rule for attorney malpractice on grounds, inter alia, 
that it would “divest[] States of authority over the entire law of imputation”); see also Boyle v. United 
Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988) (Scalia, J.) (arguing that federal common law regarding the con-
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Because when the Court engages in federal common lawmaking218 it 
crafts both a cause of action and a substantive federal right,219 under my 
rights-centric view of § 1331 the Court does concomitantly expand its juris-
diction in just the manner that Justice Powell criticized.220  But this judicial 
expansion of jurisdiction does not occur when the Court is merely inferring 
a cause of action from a preexisting right.221  Thus, the act of federal com-
mon lawmaking is far more self-aggrandizing and jurisdictionally troubling, 
just as Justice Powell outlines, than the act of inferring a cause of action 
from a preexisting right.  Nevertheless, the Court has squarely held that 
federal common law questions do arise under § 1331.222  Surely, then, if the 
federal courts have jurisdiction to exercise the broader power of creating 
both rights and causes of action from whole cloth as a matter of common 
                                                                                                                              
tractual rights of the United States preempts state law); United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 
715, 726 (1979) (positing that legal obligations under federal expenditure programs are to be governed 
by federal law); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426–27 (1964) (asserting that fed-
eral law controls interstate water apportionment, even in the face of an interstate compact); Mark D. Ro-
sen, Was Shelley v. Kraemer Incorrectly Decided? Some New Answers, 95 CAL. L. REV. 451, 494–95 
(2007) (“[C]onstitutional preemption is a component of almost all the federal common law decisions 
that displace state law with a judicially created alternative.”); Tidmarsh & Murray, supra note 208, at 
615 (“Federal common law displaces state law, and thus shifts the balance of power from state to federal 
government.”). 
218  I am not proposing that making law itself is necessarily troublesome, but only that in the § 1331 
context there is a unique jurisdictional difficulty.  Federal courts must surely have some ability to create 
law.  See, e.g., Paul M. Bator, The Constitution as Architecture: Legislative and Administrative Courts 
Under Article III, 65 IND. L.J. 233, 265 (1990) (“[I]t is naïve—as well as undesirable—to think of sepa-
ration of power rules as capable of creating sealed chambers each of which must contain all there is of 
the executive, the legislative and the judicial powers.  Overlap is inevitable.”); Bernard Schwartz, Curi-
ouser and Curiouser: The Supreme Court’s Separation of Powers Wonderland, 65 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 587, 590 (1990) (“[A] strict separation of powers . . . was deliberately rejected at the outset.  
Whatever separation of powers may be provided for, it does not compel a bright line separation between 
the departments . . . .”).  But Justice Scalia rejects this position, and his rejection may well support his 
overall tribunals position.  Compare Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 381 (1989) (stating that 
the Court is heir to a “pragmatic, flexible view of differentiated governmental power”), with id. at 417 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he power to make law cannot be exercised by anyone other than Congress, 
except in conjunction with the lawful exercise of executive or judicial power.”).  Justice Scalia is not 
entirely consistent in this strict separation of powers view, however.  See Boyle, 487 U.S. 500 (Scalia, J.) 
(creating a federal common law defense to a state law tort action against a federal contractor). 
219  The creation of federal common law procedural rules and defenses, however, does not raise 
§ 1331 problems under my view as there is no possibility of satisfying the well-pleaded complaint rule 
in the first instance.  See, e.g., Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 499 (2001) 
(creating a federal common law rule to regulate the preclusive effect of federal dismissals of state law 
claims); Boyle, 487 U.S. at 504 (creating a federal common law defense). 
220  See Mulligan, supra note 121, at 1736–37. 
221  See supra Part I.B.1.b.  
222  Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 100 (1972) (“[Section] 1331 jurisdiction will support 
claims founded upon federal common law as well as those of a statutory origin.”).  Because of this juris-
diction-enlarging quality, courts employ a more stringent jurisdictional standard for pure-federal com-
mon law cases than they do for other § 1331 cases.  See Mulligan, supra note 121, at 1737–40.  
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law, they have jurisdiction to exercise the lesser power of creating only a 
cause of action. 
 
 * * * 
 
In sum, I find the statutory version of the tribunals position unsound.  
First, the argument is grounded upon a poor understanding of § 1331 doc-
trine because it assumes that the successful establishment of a federal cause 
of action is the key determination for vesting statutory jurisdiction.  Rather, 
it is the concept of a federal right that does the heavy lifting here.  Thus the 
judicial creation of a cause of action does not constitute a concomitant crea-
tion of the § 1331 jurisdictional hook.  Second, the Court’s recent approval 
of hearing hybrid claims under § 1331 undermines the force of the statutory 
argument.  Third, assuming, as the Court does, that taking jurisdiction over 
federal common law claims is not problematic, a fortiori, there should be 
no jurisdictional concerns over merely implying a cause of action as a func-
tion of legislative intent.  Thus, I do not find a § 1331 barrier to the infer-
ence of causes of actions from federal statutes.223 
II. THE ARTICLE III ARGUMENT 
The lack of a statutory jurisdictional barrier to the inference of a cause 
of action does not end the discussion; there may well be a constitutionally 
based jurisdictional defect for such inferences.  The traditional scholarly 
view has not found such a constitutional difficulty.  This view looks first to 
ancient English practice,224 noting that the raison d’être for the courts of eq-
uity is fulfillment of the maxim “equity will not suffer a wrong to be with-
out a remedy.”225  Pursuant to this end, the Chancellor would fashion new 
causes of action to correct wrongs suffered.226  Moreover, implication of 
 
  
223  To be clear, I am not advocating that the mere existence of the jurisdictional statute affirmatively 
empowers the practice, but only that it is not a hindrance.  Despite suggestions in implied cause of action 
cases decided before the 1970s that a specific jurisdictional grant might support a private cause of ac-
tion, see J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430–31 (1964), the idea that a congressional grant of ju-
risdiction does more than give federal courts the ability to hear a case has generally been repudiated.  
Such a grant does not provide a lawmaking power for implied cause of action cases.  See Brown, supra 
note 17, at 646; Creswell, supra note 16, at 979; Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Pro-
grams and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1221 (1982). 
224  Scholars in this traditional camp trace the ability to infer actions from statutes to the English 
Statute of Westminster II.  See Statute of Westminster II, 13 Edw. I, c. 50 (1285) (Eng.) (“Moreover, 
concerning the Statutes provided where the Law faileth, and for Remedies, lest Suitors coming to the 
King’s Court should depart from thence without Remedy, they shall have Writs provided in their 
Cases . . . .”); Theodore F. T. Plucknett, Case and the Statute of Westminster II, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 778 
(1931) (discussing the attribution of the practice of inferring actions from statutes to the Statute of 
Westminster II); Zeigler, Integrated Approach, supra note 4, at 71 n.12 (tracing the practice to the Stat-
ute of Westminster II). 
225  Zeigler, Rights Require, supra note 19, at 667–69. 
226  Id. 
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causes of action to remedy preexisting legal rights was not limited to the old 
English courts of equity.  King’s Bench as well as early state court deci-
sions regularly inferred legal remedies for statutory violations.227  Many 
scholars have pointed to this ancient lineage to conclude that the federal 
courts, as inheritors of this tradition, are empowered to infer causes of ac-
tion.228  
Recent scholarship, however, challenges this predominant view, con-
cluding that Article III places jurisdictional limits upon the ability of the 
federal courts to infer causes of action.  In this Part, I review this variation 
of the tribunals position.  I then present two challenges to the position.  I ar-
gue that even if this historical analysis is correct, it fails to explain how this 
interpretation is to be applied in a contemporary context.  I further contend 
that the jurisdictional limits proposed are redundant of modern standing 
doctrine. 
 
  
227  The Supreme Court has recognized this historical power.  See, e.g., Franklin v. Gwinnett County 
Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 66 (1992) (“From the earliest years of the Republic, the Court has recognized 
the power of the Judiciary to award appropriate remedies to redress injuries actionable in federal court, 
although it did not always distinguish clearly between a right to bring suit and a remedy available under 
such a right.”); California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 299–300 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting 
that “implication of private causes of action was a well-known practice at common law and in American 
courts” and citing early English authorities).  There are several King’s and Queen’s Bench cases em-
blematic of this authority.  See, e.g., Couch v. Steel, (1854) 118 Eng. Rep. 1193, 1196–98 (K.B.) (infer-
ring a cause of action from a statute requiring merchant vessels to carry appropriate medicines while at 
sea); Ashby v. White, (1703) 92 Eng. Rep. 126, 136–39 (K.B.) (inferring a cause of action for the failure 
to tally votes in a parliamentary election); Anonymous, (1703) 87 Eng. Rep. 791, 791 (Q.B.) (“[W]here-
ever a statute enacts anything, or prohibits anything, for the advantage of any person, that person shall 
have remedy to recover the advantage given him, or to have satisfaction for the injury done him contrary 
to law by the same statute; for it would be a fine thing to make a law by which one has a right, but no 
remedy but in equity.”).  But see Atkinson v. Newcastle & Gateshead Waterworks Co., (1877) 2 Exch. 
Div. 441, 444 (questioning Couch); Stevens v. Jeacocke, (1848) 116 Eng. Rep. 647, 652 (Q.B.) (holding 
that imposition of penalty precluded private remedy).  Early state court decisions drew upon these au-
thorities.  See, e.g., Stearns v. Atl. & St. Lawrence R.R. Co., 46 Me. 95, 115 (1858) (citing Ashby for the 
proposition that every right has a remedy); Stout v. Keyes, 2 Doug. 184, 187 (Mich. 1845) (“It is a gen-
eral principle of the common law, that whenever the law gives a right, or prohibits an injury, it also 
gives a remedy by action; and, where no specific remedy is given for an injury complained of, a remedy 
may be had by special action on the case.”); Calking v. Baldwin, 4 Wend. 668, 671 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1830) 
(presenting as the general rule that “if a statute gives a remedy in the affirmative, without a negative ex-
pressed or implied, for a matter which was actionable at common law, the party is not deprived of his 
common law remedy, but may elect to take it or that offered by the statute”). 
228  See, e.g., Walter E. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. 
L. REV. 1532, 1542 (1972) (recognizing the “common law background in which courts created damage 
remedies as a matter of course”); Foy, supra note 19, at 534 (same); Linda Sheryl Greene, Judicial Im-
plication of Remedies for Federal Statutory Violations: The Separation of Powers Concerns, 53 TEMP. 
L.Q. 469, 472 (1980) (accord); Stabile, supra note 19, at 864 (arguing that common law courts had full 
authority to infer actions from statutes); Zeigler, Integrated Approach, supra note 4, at 103 (same). 
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A. Article III Constrained by Writ Pleading 
Although scholars have been the primary proponents of an Article III 
restraint upon inferring causes of action, members of the Court have offered 
Article III-based arguments as well.  Justice Black offered such a view in 
his dissent to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics—a ruling that inferred a cause of action directly from the Fourth 
Amendment.229  In his dissent, Justice Black argued that the inference of a 
cause of action directly from the Constitution constituted a legislative, not 
judicial, action.230  Indeed, the very heart of legislative control over the ju-
risdiction of the lower federal courts, Justice Black argued, resides in mak-
ing difficult choices as to which types of claims warrant the courts’ limited 
adjudicative resources.231  As a result, in Justice Black’s view, the Court’s 
inferring a cause of action constituted an “exercise of power that the Consti-
tution does not give us.”232  Justices Powell, Blackmun, and Scalia, follow-
ing Justice Black, have similarly argued that inferring causes of action from 
the Constitution or statutes reaches beyond the Court’s Article III powers 
into legislative territory reserved for Congress.233   
More recently, Professor Bellia in a powerful piece offers a more nu-
anced argument that Article III constrains the ability of federal courts to in-
fer causes of action.234  He contends that, from an originalist perspective, 
Article III federal question jurisdiction must be understood within the con-
text of common law writ pleading prevalent at the country’s Founding.235  
 
  
229  403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
230  Id. at 429–30 (Black, J., dissenting) (“Should the time come when Congress desires such law-
suits, it has before it a model of valid legislation, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to create a damage remedy against 
federal officers.  Cases could be cited to support the legal proposition which I assert, but it seems to me 
to be a matter of common understanding that the business of the judiciary is to interpret the laws and not 
to make them.”). 
231  Id. at 428 (“Of course, there are instances of legitimate grievances [pertaining to violations of 
the Fourth Amendment], but legislators might well desire to devote judicial resources to other problems 
of a more serious nature.”). 
232  Id.   
233  See Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 732 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) (“[T]he . . . im-
plication applied by the Court today . . . represents judicial assumption of the legislative function . . . .”); 
see also Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 191 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (adopting Justice 
Powell’s view); Bivens, 403 U.S. at 430 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (providing a similar argument). 
234  Bellia, supra note 26, passim (arguing that Article III is best interpreted in light of writ pleading 
concepts and that this insight produces important ramifications for understanding Article III federal 
question jurisdiction under Osborn, standing doctrine, and inferred cause of action doctrine).  But note 
that professors Stewart and Sunstein reject the view that “[t]hese objections to judicial creation of pri-
vate remedies can be summarized in what we term the formalist thesis.  That thesis holds that legal 
rights cannot be derived from conceptions of natural justice, background understandings, or theories of 
sound government.  Unless the right to be vindicated is granted by the Constitution or a statute, courts 
lack authority to recognize it; the only basis of legal rights is a textual instrument drawn by a sovereign 
lawmaking authority.”  Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 223, at 1221. 
235  Bellia, supra note 26, at 780–81. 
104:175  (2010) Federal Courts Not Federal Tribunals 
 211 
He argues that the ability of a federal court to infer a cause of action from a 
statute is thus constrained by the confines of the common law writs.236  
It is key to note that our contemporary understanding of rights and 
causes of action as distinct analytic notions does not map onto the legal 
world of the late eighteenth century.  At common law, the possession of a 
legal right by a wronged individual was necessarily coterminus with the 
possession of a cause of action to enforce that right in court.237  
“[C]ontemporary modes of jurisprudential thought . . . link[ed] ‘rights’ and 
‘remedies’ in a 1:1 correlation.”238  Similarly, the federal courts found that 
“it is a general and indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there 
is also a legal remedy by suit or action at law, whenever that right is in-
vaded.”239  Under this system of procedure, then, litigants had to identify a 
particular writ or form of action (e.g., assumpsit, replevin, debt, trespass) in 
order to present a judiciable claim.240  
While in very early times the courts of England had some ability to 
craft new writs, by the time of the Founding, the number of writs was 
static.241  A plaintiff could only bring suit if he could identify a form of ac-
tion at law or equity that would support the relief sought.242  Legal rights, 
then, could only be enforced by way of an enumerated writ.  The writ in 
turn supplied the plaintiff’s cause of action, which also delineated the type 
of remedy the plaintiff could hope to achieve.243  Under the writ pleading 
system, therefore, the form of action (i.e., the writ) supplied the right, the 
cause of action, and the remedy.  
Against this backdrop, Professor Bellia reexamines the Founding-era 
English and American cases that inferred what moderns would style a cause 
of action for a statutory violation when the statute failed to explicitly pro-
vide for one.  In each instance, he contends, the court was able to infer a 
cause of action only because the plaintiff had successfully invoked a com-
 
  
236  Id. at 838 (“At common law, courts did not create remedies whenever a defendant deprived a 
plaintiff of a statutory benefit; they afforded common law remedies that existed under state law or gen-
eral principles for certain injuries that happened to arise from a statutory violation.  Again, to advocate a 
return to the common law approach, but to substitute a benefit- or rights-based conception of the cause 
of action, is to claim a broader judicial power than courts historically exercised.”). 
237  See Mulligan, supra note 121, at 1678–79. 
238  Bivens, 403 U.S. at 400 n.3 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
239  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES *23). 
240  See, e.g., F.W. MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW: A COURSE OF LECTURES 
5–10 (1936). 
241  Id. 
242  Id. 
243  Id.; see also Zeigler, Integrated Approach, supra note 4, at 105–15 (discussing the traditional 
congruity of these concepts and the ramifications for contemporary practice).  
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mon law writ within which to nestle the statutory violation.244  Take the cel-
ebrated English case of Ashby v. White,245 for example.  Here Parliament 
eventually upheld the plaintiff’s suit to enforce—by what a modern would 
style as an inferred cause of action—a statutory right to have his vote in a 
parliamentary election tallied.246  Lord Holt opined that “[w]here a new Act 
of Parliament is made for the benefit of the subject, if a man be hindered 
from the enjoyment of it, he shall have an action against such person who 
so obstructed him.”247  Many look to this case, and this passage in particular, 
as strong precedent justifying the power of the federal courts to infer causes 
of action from statutes.248  A careful reading of the case, however, shows 
that the plaintiff in Ashby asserted a form of action, namely trespass on the 
case, and that without that assertion of a writ the court would have been 
powerless to provide a remedy.249  Expounding upon Ashby, Professor Bel-
lia concludes that, at the time of the Founding, “[i]f a statute did not ex-
pressly confer a remedy on the plaintiff, a cause of action [at common law] 
for its violation would lie only if one of the forms of action—e.g., debt, 
case, assumpsit—provided a remedy for the kind of injury that the statutory 
violation caused.”250 
Importantly, specific pleading requirements accompanied each form of 
action.  For example, under the form of trespass on the case, which pro-
vided the form of action for the bulk of implied statutory actions in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a plaintiff needed to show an injury to 
person or property in order to succeed.251  Indeed, the question of whether 
the plaintiff suffered an injury to property was the key issue in the Ashby 
case.252  Lord Holt concluded that the right of election, under the then-
existing scheme in which only property owners could vote, was “insepara-
 
  
244  See Bellia, supra note 26, at 840; see also Bullard v. Bell, 4 F. Cas. 624, 639 (C.C.D.N.H. 1817) 
(No. 2,121) (Story, Circuit Justice) (noting that “[a]n action adapted to the nature of the case” must be 
“moulded according to the forms and distinctions of the common law”). 
245  (1703) 92 Eng. Rep. 126 (K.B.). 
246  Id. at 127. 
247  Id. at 136. 
248  See supra note 227 (citing case law and academic reliance on Ashby).  
249  Bellia, supra note 26, at 840–41.   
250  Id. at 839. 
251  Id. at 849 (“Courts did not afford remedies to any individual deprived of a statutory benefit; they 
afforded remedies, primarily through the action of case, to individuals deprived of statutory benefits and 
suffering a certain kind of injury or wrong thereby.  The legal determinant of whether the plaintiff had 
suffered a certain kind of injury or wrong belonged to the finite set of determinants that courts appear to 
have believed constrained them in recognizing causes of action for statutory violations.”). 
252  92 Eng. Rep. at 129 (Gould, J.) (arguing that “[t]o raise an action upon the case, both damage 
and injury must concur” and that “the plaintiff’s privilege of voting is not a matter of property or profit, 
so that the hindrance of it is merely damnum sine injuria”); id. at 133 (Powell, J.) (“[H]ere is not a dam-
age upon which this action is maintainable; for to maintain an action upon the case, there must be either 
a real damage, or a possibility of a real damage, and not merely a damage in opinion or consequence of 
law.”).  
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ble from the freehold.”253  Thus, common law courts had the power to rem-
edy statutory violations that lacked statutory causes of action, but this 
power was constrained by the fact that the plaintiff had to plead and prove 
his case by way of one of the preexisting writs.  These forms of action, in 
turn, constrained the types of remedies the court could award as well as lim-
ited those awards to certain types of injuries. 
Because this fettered power to infer a cause of action was the prevail-
ing view at the time of the Founding, Professor Bellia contends that an ori-
ginalist reading of Article III cannot support the notion that the federal 
courts have unbounded constitutional power to infer causes of action 
now.254  Following this approach, then, a federal court (as purely an Article 
III matter) may infer a cause of action from a federal statute only when: (1) 
the plaintiff has been injured in a manner that would have been recogniz-
able at common law, and (2) the injury would have given rise to a common 
law form of action to remedy it.255   
B. Two Challenges 
With the Article III version of the tribunals position at hand, I turn to 
two intra-originalist objections.  First, I argue that even assuming Article III 
should be interpreted from an originalist perspective and that every histori-
cal point upon which the position relies is accurate, the proposed dual con-
straints upon the federal courts’ power to infer causes of action (viz., an 
injury cognizable at common law and existence of an applicable common 
law writ) do not necessarily follow.  Even if the original public meaning of 
Article III imposes a writ pleading understanding of a court’s ability to infer 
a cause of action, it remains an open question of construction as to how 
contemporary federal courts should apply that understanding into a system 
that has done away with writ pleading.  Second, even if the tribunals posi-
tion’s construction of Article III carries the day, in practice it would impose 
no further restrictions upon the power of the federal courts to infer a cause 
of action than is already found in contemporary standing doctrine.  
1. Interpretation Versus Construction.—I turn first to the problem of 
constitutional construction as it relates to the Article III variant of the tribu-
nals position.  The tribunals position relies upon an originalist interpretation 
 
  
253  Id. at 134. 
254  Bellia, supra note 26, at 851.  
255  Id. at 849–50 (“If historical practice is to be our guide, however, we should not selectively focus 
on one necessary but insufficient determinant of whether a plaintiff had a cause of action (e.g., depriva-
tion of statutory benefit) to the exclusion of other necessary determinants (e.g., resulting in a certain 
kind of injury).”).  To be clear, this Article III argument should not be confused with Justices Powell and 
Scalia’s argument.  Their view finds every (or almost every) implication of a statutory cause of action to 
be extrajurisdictional.  But their view “does not squarely reflect the historical practice of English and 
state courts.”  Id. at 851. 
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of the Constitution.256  But originalism is a term with many different mean-
ings.257  Some define it as an approach to constitutional interpretation that 
finds the Framers’ and ratifiers’ actual, subjective understandings of the 
constitutional text the lodestar for constitutional adjudication.258  On the 
whole, however, this search for subjective intent has been abandoned.259  
Most originalists now confine the approach to a quest for original public 
meaning of the text.260  Instead of searching for subjective meanings that the 
Framers personally adopted, original meaning originalists seek “the mean-
ing a reasonable speaker of English would have attached to the words, 
phrases, sentences, etc. at the time the particular provision was adopted.”261  
Within the now predominant original public meaning school of origi-
nalism, an important new development has come to the fore: constructivist 
originalism.  Following three leading scholars,262 most public meaning 
 
  
256  Id. at 849–50.  
257  See, e.g., Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599 (2004) (de-
scribing the rise of original public meaning originalism); Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism 16–
27 (Ill. Pub. Law Research Paper No. 07-24, 2008) [hereinafter Solum, Semantic], available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1120244 (reviewing the evolution of originalism as an interpretive tool). 
258  See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning, 
119 HARV. L. REV. 1275, 1317 (2006) (defining originalism as “the theory that the original understand-
ing of those who wrote and ratified various constitutional provisions determines their current meaning”); 
William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 694 (1976) (though 
not using the term “originalism,” adopting a similar view of the interpretive methods that contrast with 
living constitutionalism, although focusing more upon the intent of the Framers); Robert H. Bork, Neu-
tral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 13 (1971) (same). 
259  See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 
204, 231–34 (1980) (critiquing the subjective intent of the Framers’ approach to originalism).  
260  See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611 (1999); 
Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret Drafting 
History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1122–34 (2003); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 849 (1989); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 
(1989).  
261  Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 101, 105 
(2001) (“It is originalist because it disregards any change to that meaning that may have occurred in the 
intervening years.  It is objective insofar as it looks to the public meaning conveyed by the words used in 
the Constitution, rather than to the subjective intentions of its framers or ratifiers.”); see also ANTONIN 
SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION; FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 38 (1997) (“What I look for 
in the Constitution is precisely what I look for in a statute: the original meaning of the text, not what the 
original draftsmen intended.”); Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 260, at 1132 (“Thus, when we use the 
term ‘originalism,’ it is not in reference to a theory of ‘original intent’ or ‘original understanding.’  
Rather, it is in reference to the original, non-idiosyncratic meaning of words and phrases in the Constitu-
tion: how the words and phrases, and structure (and sometimes even the punctuation marks!) would have 
been understood by a hypothetical, objective, reasonably well-informed reader of those words and 
phrases, in context, at the time they were adopted, and within the political and linguistic community in 
which they were adopted.” (footnote omitted)). 
262  See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, 
ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 7 (1999) [hereinafter WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION] (“Regardless of the extent of judicial interpretation of certain aspects of the Constitu-
tion, there will remain an impenetrable sphere of meaning that cannot be simply discovered.  The judici-
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originalists now “explicitly embrace the idea that the original public mean-
ing of the text ‘runs out’” in some cases.263  The constructivist originalist, 
thus, engages in two distinct enterprises when applying the Constitution.264  
First and foremost, the public meaning originalist “interprets” the Constitu-
tion, using original public meaning to delimit as much textual meaning as 
possible.265  But this original public meaning will at times be “underdeter-
minate”266 in yielding a rule of law to be applied in particular cases.267  This 
underdeterminancy may occur because the text is vague, ambiguous, silent 
on the issue, contradictory, or reaches the issue at hand only by implica-
tion.268  In such instances, the originalist must engage in an act of “construc-
tion” to create a legal rule.269  This act of construction necessarily “must be 
guided by something other than the semantic content of the constitutional 
text,” because such circumstances arise uniquely in those cases where the 
original meaning of the text does not answer the question presented.270  
                                                                                                                              
ary may be able to delimit textual meaning, hedging in the possibilities, but after all judgments have 
been rendered specifying discoverable meaning, major indeterminacies may remain.  The specification 
of a single governing meaning from these possibilities requires an act of creativity beyond interpreta-
tion. . . .  This additional step is the construction of meaning.”); see also RANDY E. BARNETT, 
RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 118–30 (2004) (discussing how 
constitutional construction differs from constitutional interpretation); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 1–19 (1999) 
[hereinafter WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION] (same); Robert N. Clinton, Original Un-
derstanding, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of “This Constitution,” 72 IOWA L. REV. 1177, 
1264–76 (1987) (distinguishing “extraconstitutional” from “contraconstitutional” interpretations). 
263  Solum, Semantic, supra note 257, at 19.  See also Lee J. Strang, Originalism and the “Challenge 
of Change”: Abduced-Principle Originalism and Other Mechanisms by Which Originalism Sufficiently 
Accommodates Changed Social Conditions, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 927, 961–62 (2009) (noting that the pre-
dominate view endorses the interpretation versus construction divide but devising a theory of “abduced-
principles originalism” as a means of addressing the lack of original public meaning without relying as 
heavily on construction). 
264  See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 262, at 118–30 (discussing how constitutional construction dif-
fers from constitutional interpretation); Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. 
REV. 1, 51 (2004) (arguing that there is a distinction between constitutional meaning and constitutional 
decision rules, which direct the application of that meaning). 
265  See Solum, Semantic, supra note 257, at 7. 
266  See Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 462, 473 (1987) (providing a discussion of the nature and extent of underdeterminacy); Solum, 
Semantic, supra note 257, at 75 (arguing that construction is appropriate in cases of constitutional un-
derdeterminancy). 
267  See Barnett, Commerce Clause, supra note 261, at 108–10 (discussing the need for constitu-
tional construction). 
268  See Solum, Semantic, supra note 257, at 69. 
269  See discussion of constitutional construction supra note 262.  
270  See Solum, Semantic, supra note 257, at 68–69 (“When constitutional practice requires that rules 
of constitutional law go beyond semantic content, then the activity of supplying that content is ‘constitu-
tional construction.’  Thus, the distinction can be summarized in the following slogan: Constitutional 
construction begins when the meaning discovered by constitutional interpretation runs out.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
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Following this approach, constitutional interpretation is an act of his-
torical investigation, seeking to find the original public meaning of the text.  
This methodology is the primary tool for reaching answers to constitutional 
questions for originalists.271  Constitutional construction, on the other hand, 
is the analytically distinct, creative endeavor272 of crafting a constitutional 
rule in the face of textual underdeterminancy.273  As a corollary, then, once 
this “something other than the semantic content” begins to lead a court’s 
constitutional rulemaking, the presumptions of legitimacy that accompany 
originalist interpretation are no longer present.274  As a result, any act of 
constitutional construction requires a normative defense that is independent 
of those normative principles that support originalist interpretation.275  
This distinction between interpretation and construction sheds a great 
deal of light upon the Article III variation on the tribunals position.  I will 
assume that the proponents of the tribunals position have correctly inter-
preted Article III’s original public meaning as embedded within the con-
cepts of writ pleading.  Nevertheless, the proponents of the Article III 
tribunals position fail to recognize that they face a question of construction, 
unless they are willing to take the hard stance that Article III prohibits the 
use of any scheme of civil procedure other than writ pleading (which they 
generally are not)276 or reject the distinction between constitutional con-
 
  
271  See DENNIS J. GOLDFORD, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION AND THE DEBATE OVER 
ORIGINALISM 11 (2005) (stating that originalists claim that “the original understanding of the constitu-
tional text always trumps any contrary understanding of that text”); Strang, supra note 263, at 981 (“In 
situations where the Constitution’s original meaning is determinate, there is no flexibility: the inter-
preter—the courts, the President, or Congress—has no choice and must follow its mandate.”).  
272  See id., at 961 n.203 (noting that construction’s “usage by Whittington and Bar-
nett . . . designate[s] creative activity,” not an interpretive endeavor). 
273  See Solum, Semantic, supra note 257, at 67 (distinguishing “between constitutional interpreta-
tion (the activity directed at discerning the semantic content of the constitutional text) and constitutional 
construction (the activity directed at resolving vagueness, ambiguity, gaps, and contradictions and at 
constitutional implicature)”).  
274  Id. at 19.   
275  See id. at 127.  The normative principle supporting original interpretation is often presented as 
deriving from the fact that we have a written constitution.  See id. at 100–17 (arguing that the Constitu-
tion’s “writtenness” is central to originalism); WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, su-
pra note 262, at 50 (arguing that “a written constitution requires an originalist interpretation”).  Other 
justifications are often given as well.  See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our Super-
majoritarian Constitution, 80 TEX. L. REV. 703, 802–04 (2002) (arguing that originalism is justified be-
cause it protects the good consequences that arise from the Constitution’s supermajority requirements); 
Lee J. Strang, The Clash of Rival and Incompatible Philosophical Traditions Within Constitutional In-
terpretation: Originalism Grounded in the Central Western Philosophical Tradition, 28 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 909, 983–97 (2005) (using the Aristotelian tradition’s concept of the common good and the 
related concept of authority to justify originalism). 
276  Indeed, the very earliest Court rulings assumed flexibility in crafting rules of procedure.  See 
Rule, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 411, 413–14 (1792) (Jay, C.J.) (stating that while the “Court considers the practice 
of the courts of King’s Bench and Chancery in England, as affording outlines for the practice of this 
court,” it retained the power to “from time to time, make such alterations therein, as circumstances may 
render necessary”); see also Rules of Practice for the Courts of Equity of the United States, 20 U.S. (7 
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struction and interpretation altogether277 (which, again, most are not).278  The 
semantic meaning of the text of the Constitution simply does not answer the 
question of how to apply writ pleading concepts into a system that has 
abandoned writ pleading; as such, the endeavor is one of construction, not 
interpretation.279  Moreover, because this endeavor is one of construction, 
the grounds of legitimacy available to originalist interpretation are not pre-
sent.  A proponent of the Article III version of the tribunals position, then, 
must provide an independent normative basis for the view that modern 
courts are constrained by Article III from inferring causes of action unless 
the plaintiff suffered an injury that would have been remediable by way of a 
common law writ. 
The Court’s analogous Seventh Amendment jurisprudence illustrates 
how the merger of law and equity forces interpretation to yield to construc-
tion.  By all accounts, this Amendment by its very text demands an original-
                                                                                                                              
Wheat.) xvii (1822) (adopting formal rules of equity practice).  Professor Suja Thomas, however, argues 
primarily on Seventh Amendment grounds that the Constitution requires much more fidelity to eight-
eenth-century procedural practice.  See, e.g., Suja A. Thomas, Why the Motion to Dismiss is Now Un-
constitutional, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1851 (2008); Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment is 
Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 139 (2007).  Showing sympathy for this view, the Court has at times 
decried procedural innovation.  See, e.g., McFaul v. Ramsey, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 523, 525 (1857).  Inter-
preting the new Iowa code system, the McFaul Court complained that many states had “ruthlessly abol-
ished” writ pleading, a system “matured by the wisdom of ages” and “founded on principles of truth and 
sound reason.”  Id.  The Court continued that “[t]he distinction between the different forms of actions 
for different wrongs, requiring different remedies, lies in the nature of things; it is absolutely inseparable 
from the correct administration of justice in common-law courts.”  Id. 
277  See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory 
of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 773 (2009) (arguing that 
the Framers did not employ “construction” and that proper interpretation avoids the need).  It is beyond 
the scope of this article to fully engage with Professors McGinnis and Rappaport’s insightful argument 
here.  But I will offer two thoughts on why their view does not offer much help in this particular context.  
First, they argue that rules of interpretation can adequately address problems of textual vagueness or 
ambiguity without resort to construction.  Id. at 774.  But construction problems arise more properly 
within the broader context of underdeterminancy.  See supra notes 263–270 and accompanying text.  
The question this Article addresses—how to reconcile a writ pleading understanding of Article III with a 
non-writ pleading litigation scheme—is neither ambiguous nor vague.  See McGinnis & Rappaport, su-
pra, at 773–74 (defining the terms).  Rather, the semantic meaning of the Constitution is underdetermi-
nate here because the text is silent on the issue—a concept distinct from vagueness or ambiguity.  See 
Solum, Semantic, supra note 257, at 69.  Thus, McGinnis and Rappaport do not squarely address the is-
sue presented in this Article.  Second, McGinnis and Rappaport actually endorse construction in all but 
name.  See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra, at 775.  They contend that in cases where rules of interpreta-
tion are in equipoise, the courts should defer to legislative judgment as to the constitutionality of the act.  
Id.  Thus, they offer a rule of decision for cases where interpretation fails to provide such a rule.  Now 
McGinnis and Rappaport insist this is not construction, id., but their rule appears as an archetypal exam-
ple of construction.  See supra notes 266–270 and accompanying text.  Moreover, even if McGinnis and 
Rappaport’s view applied to the questions this Article raises, I think that they would adopt some rule of 
deference to congressional intent, which is similar to the conclusion that I offer.  See infra notes 296–
301 and accompanying text.  
278  See Strang, supra note 263, at 961–62 (noting that the predominant view endorses the interpreta-
tion versus construction divide). 
279  See Solum, Semantic, supra note 257, at 68.   
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ist interpretation.280 The Court, however, has dealt with a series of puzzles 
of construction since the merger of law and equity—all relating to the ap-
plication of eighteenth-century procedural practice into a contemporary 
procedural context.281  In Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local No. 391 
v. Terry, for example, the Court grappled with the question of whether, in 
the face of legislative silence, an employee who sought relief in the form of 
backpay for a union’s alleged breach of its duty of fair representation under 
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act had a right to trial by 
jury.282  All of the Justices and the parties agreed on the appropriate consti-
tutional interpretation: The plaintiff should have a jury trial right only if the 
claim presented was “legal” as opposed to “equitable,” as these terms were 
understood at the Founding.283  The Court held that the plaintiffs did have a 
right to a jury trial, but it failed to reach a majority on the constructive 
methodology employed in reaching this result.284   
This disagreement among the Justices illustrates, I contend, that when 
dealing with procedural issues such as jury rights or the power to infer a 
cause of action, settling upon the correct original public meaning of the 
relevant text does not lead to an obvious rule of construction for applying 
that rule outside of a writ pleading regime.  Given this translation problem, 
it is not obvious that Professor Bellia’s constraints are the best construction 
of eighteenth-century inferred cause of action practice for a contemporary 
setting.  He contends that Article III limits a federal court’s power to infer a 
cause of action from a federal statute or the Constitution when: (1) the 
plaintiff has been deprived of a statutory or constitutional right in a manner 
that would have been recognized as an injury at common law, and (2) the 
 
  
280  The Seventh Amendment provides that “[i]n Suits at common law, where the value in contro-
versy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.”  U.S. CONST. amend. VII.  
It is widely accepted that this text requires an originalist interpretation.  See, e.g., David L. Shapiro & 
Daniel R. Coquillette, The Fetish of Jury Trial in Civil Cases: A Comment on Rachal v. Hill, 85 HARV. 
L. REV. 442, 449 (1971) (“Even the most ardent critic of any historical test would concede that matters 
that would have fallen entirely within the jurisdiction of a court of equity or admiralty in 1791 do not 
come within the definition of a suit at ‘common law’ under the seventh amendment.”); Suja A. Thomas, 
The Unconstitutionality of Summary Judgment: A Status Report, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1613, 1616 (2008) 
(“The Seventh Amendment, however, is the only part of the Constitution that explicitly, through the 
text, requires this application of originalism.”).  
281  See, e.g., Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565 (1990) 
(“Since the merger of the systems of law and equity, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 2, this Court has carefully 
preserved the right to trial by jury where legal rights are at stake.”); see also Tull v. United States, 481 
U.S. 412, 417 (1987) (requiring a jury trial on the merits in actions analogous to suits at common law); 
Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 501 (1959) (noting that the jury is “of such importance 
and occupies so firm a place in our history and jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment of the right to 
a jury trial should be scrutinized with the utmost care”).  
282  494 U.S. at 561. 
283  Id. at 564–65 (majority opinion); id. at 574 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 581 (Stevens, J., 
concurring); id. at 584 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
284  See infra notes 288–291.  
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plaintiff’s injury would have given rise to a common law form of action.285  
Professor Bellia’s normative defense of the view appears to be that this bi-
partite constraint is best because it follows historical understandings of the 
powers of the courts.286  But once we recognize that we are dealing with a 
question of construction, not interpretation, this normative defense—that a 
certain rule is best because it comports with original understanding—no 
longer carries implicit legitimacy.287  The historical understandings norma-
tive defense attaches to rules of interpretation, not rules of construction. 
This is not to say that the tribunals position proposed rule of construc-
tion is necessarily a poor one.  But as the Terry Court illustrates, a constitu-
tional construction that attempts to apply the common law understanding of 
a cause of action into a contemporary context could well focus on issues be-
sides type of injury and presence of a common law writ.  Indeed, because 
any theory of constitutional construction requires some normative defense 
that is independent of those normative principles that support originalist in-
terpretations,288 the door is open to many possibilities.  One could, following 
Justice Marshall’s plurality opinion in Terry, focus upon the normative im-
portance of the courts’ remedial power.  This view concludes that to deter-
mine whether a statutory action will resolve legal rights, and thus trigger a 
right to a jury trial, courts should “examine both the nature of the issues in-
volved and the remedy sought,” with the second inquiry being weightier 
than the first.289  Or one could look to these same two factors but emphasize 
the first inquiry, as Justice Kennedy did in his dissent in Terry.290  Or one 
might focus on the sole factor of whether the remedy sought would have 
been legal or equitable at the time of the Founding, as Justice Brennan sug-
gests.291  Another approach would be to adopt Justice Stevens’s three prong 
rule.292  Further still, one could adopt Professor Barnett’s general rule of 
constitutional construction that favors a libertarian set of negative rights,293 
or Professor Strang’s general rule of constitutional construction that favors 
 
  
285  Bellia, supra note 26, at 849–50. 
286  Id. (“If historical practice is to be our guide, however, we should not selectively focus on one 
necessary but insufficient determinant of whether a plaintiff had a cause of action (e.g., deprivation of 
statutory benefit) to the exclusion of other necessary determinants (e.g., resulting in a certain kind of in-
jury).”). 
287  See BARNETT, supra note 262, at 151–52. 
288  See id. at 127. 
289  Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565 (1990) (Mar-
shall, J., plurality). 
290  Id. at 584 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
291  Id. at 574 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
292  Id. at 582–83 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (considering his-
torical analogues, the “nature of the substantive right,” and the “relief sought”).  
293  See BARNETT, supra note 262, at 5 (advocating a “presumption of liberty” as the rule of con-
struction according to which “any restriction on the rightful exercise of liberty is unconstitutional unless 
and until the government convinces a hierarchy of judges that such restrictions are both necessary and 
proper”). 
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deference to Congress,294 or any other of a number of constructive ap-
proaches one might apply.295 
Other equally plausible constructions of eighteenth-century cause of 
action practice that are consistent with originalism as an interpretive tool 
are similarly available.  A construction that errs on the side of taking juris-
diction over inferred actions, for example, is normatively attractive on con-
gressional meta-intent grounds.  If the federal courts refuse to infer a cause 
of action for the violation of a federal right, the state courts would become 
the sole adjudicative bodies to hear these federal claims.296  Prior to the pas-
sage of § 1331 in 1875, such a result may well have comported with the 
congressional default preference that federal rights are to be litigated in 
state courts, but this is no longer the case.297  Since the passage of § 1331, 
the congressional creation of rights, absent a clear statement to the con-
trary,298 constitutes strong evidence of legislative intent that these rights 
should be vindicated in a federal forum.  The Court engages in this strong 
presumption in favor of federal jurisdiction because Congress legislates 
against a historical backdrop in which the enforcement of statutory federal 
rights by federal courts was essential and the Court assumes Congress in-
tends its new statutes be enforced with equal vigor.299  Indeed, the Court 
 
  
294  See Strang, supra note 263, at 981 (“[W]here the Constitution’s original meaning is under- or 
indeterminate, Congress has the authority to make constitutional determinations, also labeled constitu-
tional constructions.”). 
295  See Solum, Semantic, supra note 257, at 76–79 (reviewing possible theories of construction). 
296  See Sloss, supra note 24, at 377 (arguing that the effect of such a practice would be to empower 
the state courts as the final interpreters of federal statutes on this score).  
297  28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006).  Excepting statutory amounts in controversy, the Act has been essen-
tially unchanged since 1875.  See, e.g., Federal Question Jurisdictional Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. 
L. No. 96-486, § 2, 94 Stat. 2369 (1980) (striking out the minimum amount in controversy requirement 
of $10,000); Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-554, 72 Stat. 415 (1958) (raising the minimum amount 
in controversy requirement from $3,000 to $10,000).  Finally, following most scholars, I exclude the 
short-lived general grant of federal question jurisdiction passed at the end of President John Adams’s 
term and treat the 1875 Act as the first general federal question grant.   
298  Congress can create rights without vesting the federal courts with jurisdiction.  For instance, 
several courts have noted that the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2006), vests 
jurisdiction exclusively in the state courts, pursuant to clear congressional command.  See Murphey v. 
Lanier, 204 F.3d 911, 913–14 (9th Cir. 2000) (listing cases).  But such acts are exceptional.  See 15 
U.S.C. § 2310(d) (2006) (limiting most Magnuson–Moss Act claims to state court). 
299  See, e.g., Letters from the Federal Farmer XV (Jan. 18, 1788), reprinted in THE COMPLETE 
ANTI-FEDERALIST 315 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) (“It is true, the laws are made by the legislature; 
but the judges and juries, in their interpretations, and in directing the execution of them, have a very ex-
tensive influence for preserving or destroying liberty, and for changing the nature of the government.”); 
Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in 
Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1397 (1953) (“Remember the Federalist papers.  Were the framers 
wholly mistaken in thinking that, as a matter of the hard facts of power, a government needs courts to 
vindicate its decisions?”); id. at 1372–73 (discussing the courts’ role in enforcement proceedings and the 
constitutional constraints that come into play when Congress confers jurisdiction to enforce federal law); 
John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 712 n.163 (1997) 
(“[A]ny effort to pare back federal jurisdiction would deny Congress an important and historically effec-
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regularly engages in a similar presumption that Congress intends for the 
federal courts to hear actions to enforce constitutional rights.300  Moreover, 
such an approach would have the added (although ironic) benefit, as Justice 
Scalia noted, of presenting a clear rule of construction against which Con-
gress could legislate.301 
My argument here is modest.  I do not believe I have necessarily estab-
lished that my proposed rule of construction is normatively superior to the 
rule presented by proponents of the tribunals position.  Rather, I hope only 
to make the claims that: (1) the Article III argument weighing against juris-
diction to infer causes of action is an argument from construction, not inter-
pretation; (2) any rule of construction requires a normative defense 
independent from the claims of historical accuracy that ground originalist 
interpretation; and (3) there are normatively attractive rules of construction 
that compete with the tribunals position’s restrictive view.  
2. Standing Redux.—In addition to these construction-based con-
cerns, Professor Bellia’s view that Article III creates dual constraints upon 
the federal courts’ power to infer causes of action offers no more of a re-
                                                                                                                              
tive forum for the implementation of its laws.”); Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance 
Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1611 (2000) (“Congress gener-
ally cannot ensure enforcement of its legislative mandates without providing a federal judicial forum 
where violators of those mandates can be prosecuted.”).  Of course this raises the issue of the so-called 
parity debate between the federal and state courts.  The crux of this debate has been to determine which 
system, state or federal, better protects federal rights.  I need not dip into this debate, as it is likely inca-
pable of non-normative resolution.  See Brett C. Gerry, Parity Revisited: An Empirical Comparison of 
State and Lower Federal Court Interpretations of Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 23 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 233, 237 (1999) (noting that the question “whether state courts are doing a good job 
of interpreting the Federal Constitution . . . inevitably lead[s] to a conclusion influenced by the norma-
tive preconceptions of the person who poses the query”).  I need only assert that it makes sense to as-
sume Congress generally prefers a federal forum for the protection of federal rights.  Congress’s 
preference may have no factual foundation, but the lack of a foundation for Congress’s intent is immate-
rial when one is focusing upon congressional intent itself, as it is the constitutionally empowered actor 
here.  See Gil Seinfeld, The Federal Courts as a Franchise: Rethinking the Justifications for Federal 
Question Jurisdiction, 97 CAL. L. REV. 95, 98–99 (2009), (arguing there is reason to doubt the empirical 
basis for the widely asserted notion that the state courts are less likely to enforce federal rights than are 
the federal courts). 
300  See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr., 533 U.S. 289, 308–09 (2001) (requiring a clear statement of legislative 
intent to bar habeas corpus review of constitutional violations); Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 
(1988) (holding that “where Congress intends to preclude judicial review of constitutional claims its in-
tent to do so must be clear”); Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 681 n.12 
(1986) (requiring a heightened showing of legislative intent in part to avoid the “serious constitutional 
question” that would arise if a federal statute were construed to deny any judicial forum for a colorable 
constitutional claim); N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 112 (1982) (“We 
cannot impute to Congress an intent now or in the future to transfer jurisdiction from constitutional to 
legislative courts for the purpose of emasculating the former.”); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 373–
74 (1974) (holding that a federal statute will not be construed to preclude judicial review of constitu-
tional challenges absent clear and convincing evidence of congressional intent). 
301  Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 192 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (ar-
guing that a clear and absolute rule against inferring causes of action would be welcomed by legislators). 
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striction upon the Article III jurisdiction of the federal courts than one finds 
in contemporary standing doctrine.  Prior to the merger of law and equity in 
1938, there was no standing doctrine per se.302  The successful pleading of a 
common law or equitable form of action served as the functional equivalent 
due to the congruity of the notions of right, cause of action, and remedy un-
der the writ pleading scheme.303  After the merger of law and equity, which 
did away with forms of action in the federal system,304 the question arose as 
to who could enforce federal rights.  Thus, contemporary standing doctrine 
evolved to fill this gap.  Contemporary standing doctrine, then, is little more 
than a rule regarding injury synthesized from old writ pleading practice.305  
Thus, the tribunals position—even if it is sound as a matter of constitutional 
construction—is redundant in practice.  A more detailed review of standing 
doctrine will make the point. 
Doctrinally speaking, “standing is a question of whether a plaintiff is 
sufficiently advers[e] to a defendant to create an Art. III case or contro-
versy, or at least to overcome prudential limitations on federal court juris-
diction.”306  Pursuant to this purpose, standing doctrine, which is itself a 
 
  
302  See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Arti-
cle III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 168–70 (1992) (arguing against the view “that Article III [standing] re-
quires injury in fact, causation, and redressability,” because these “requirements [were] unknown to our 
law until the 1970s”). 
303  See William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 224 (1988) (“It is at least 
clear that current standing law is a relatively recent creation.  In the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, a plaintiff’s right to bring suit was determined by reference to a particular common law, statu-
tory, or constitutional right, or sometimes to a mixture of statutory or constitutional prohibitions and 
common law remedial principles.”); Sunstein, supra note 302, at 177 (“The discussion thus far has 
shown that early English and American practices give no support to the view that the Constitution limits 
Congress’ power to create standing.  The relevant practices suggest not that everyone has standing, nor 
that Article III allows standing for all injuries, but instead something far simpler and less exotic: people 
have standing if the law has granted them a right to bring suit.”); Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of 
Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1395 (1987) (describing the 
“syllogism of the forms”—the standing doctrine’s predecessor—where “[j]udicial power is capable of 
acting only when the subject is submitted to it, by a party who asserts his rights in the form prescribed 
by law” such that the claim only “then becomes a case” (quoting  Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 
Wheat.) 738, 819 (1824) (Marshall, C.J.) (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 1419 (explaining 
that even where the word “standing” appeared in cases in the nineteenth century, “the Court’s explicit 
consideration of ‘standing’ was an inquiry into the merits”); id. at 1451 (concluding that “[f]or over a 
hundred years, the metaphor of ‘standing’ was shorthand for the question of whether a plaintiff had as-
serted claims that a court of equity would enforce”). 
304  FED. R. CIV. P. 2. 
305  See Bellia, supra note 26, at 831–32 (“We thus see how, in the years following the merger of 
law and equity in the federal system, the Court dealt with the abolition of the forms of proceeding that 
previously determined whether an individual could bring a cause of action in federal court.  Where a 
federal regulatory scheme authorized no specific remedy for its violation, the Court generalized from 
prior practice that only individuals who had suffered an injury in fact could sue in federal court.  Where 
a federal regulatory scheme did authorize a specific remedy for its violation, the Court allowed the law-
suit to proceed, though whether it recognized that non-injured-in-fact individuals could sue to vindicate 
the public interest in such circumstances is unclear.”).  
306  Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239–40 n.18 (1979). 
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jurisdictional issue, must be decided prior to—and can therefore avoid—on-
the-merits adjudication of claims, on the ground that the party bringing the 
claim is not properly entitled to its judicial determination.307  The focus is on 
the characteristics of the plaintiff (e.g., was the plaintiff injured in fact, is 
the plaintiff representing third parties, etc.)—not the claim itself.308 
The Court now divides standing doctrine into two categories: those 
rules divined from Article III and other rules that are merely prudential (i.e., 
nonconstitutional).309  For the purposes of this discussion, I focus solely 
upon Article III standing.  The Court now applies a threefold test for deter-
mining when a plaintiff has Article III standing.  The plaintiff must plead 
that she suffered a distinct and palpable injury (the injury-in-fact require-
ment), that this injury was caused by the challenged activity of the defen-
dant (the causation requirement), and that this injury is apt to be redressed 
by a remedy that the court is empowered to award (the remediation re-
quirement).310 
Of prime importance here is the injury-in-fact requirement.  The Su-
preme Court has employed several locutions attempting to capture the no-
tion of “injury in fact”—“concrete,” “distinct and palpable,” and “actual or 
imminent.”311  All of these locutions, however, merely restate the common 
law requirement, present in most old writs, of an injury to person or prop-
erty.312  Furthermore, contemporary usage of injury-in-fact more often than 
 
  
307  See 13 CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & 
PROCEDURE § 3531 (2007) (collecting cases).  
308  Id. 
309  See, e.g., Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 128 (2004) (“The doctrine of standing asks wheth-
er a litigant is entitled to have a federal court resolve his grievance.  This inquiry involves both 
constitutional limitations on federal-court jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its exercise.” (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)).  
310  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).  The Court said:  
Over the years, our cases have established that the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing 
contains three elements.  First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact”—an invasion of 
a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized; and (b) “actual or imminent, 
not conjectural or hypothetical.”  Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury 
and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be “fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action 
of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before 
the court.”  Third, it must be “likely,” as opposed to merely “speculative,” that the injury will be 
“redressed by a favorable decision.”  
Id. (alterations in original) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
311  McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 225 (2003); see also Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. 
United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982) (“distinct and palpable in-
jury”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 239 (1982) (“concrete ad-
verseness” and “distinct and palpable injury” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Havens Realty Corp. 
v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372 (1982) (“distinct and palpable injury” (international quotation marks 
omitted)); id. at 379 (“concrete and demonstrable”).  
312  See Lee A. Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An Inadequate Surrogate for 
Claim for Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425, 426 (1974) (“A more illuminating way of looking at standing is to 
recognize that its determination is an adjudication of familiar components of a cause of action, resolved 
by asking whether a plaintiff has stated a claim for relief.  Thus substantive issues—injury, legal protec-
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not turns on whether the plaintiff has a legally protected interest.313  This in 
turn amounts to the requirement that the plaintiff’s injury is “traditionally 
thought to be capable of resolution through the judicial process.”314  That is 
to say, the Court requires that the plaintiff could have proceeded under a 
form of action at common law.315  
Contemporary standing doctrine, in large part then, assures that plain-
tiffs in federal court must seek a remedy for an injury that would have given 
rise to a common law form of action.  But this standing rule is exactly the 
same limitation that the Article III variant of the tribunals position imposes 
upon the courts’ ability to infer causes of action.316  The Article III argument 
that the inference of a cause of action is extrajurisdictional, then, amounts 
to no more than the following: Article III prohibits the inference of a cause 
of action when the plaintiff lacks standing.  This should come as no sur-
prise.  The tribunals position’s Article III limitation on the ability to infer a 
cause of action is merely redundant of current standing doctrine.  
 
 * * * 
 
In sum, one need not even reject originalism as an interpretive enter-
prise to be unmoved by the Article III argument that inferring a cause of ac-
tion is extrajurisdictional.  First, the proposed dual constraints upon the 
courts’ ability to infer causes of action are rules of construction, not strictly 
interpretation.  From this perspective, it is far from obvious that the rule of 
construction posited by proponents of the tribunals position is the best nor-
mative option.  Second, even if this rule of construction is the best one 
available, it is, in practice, redundant of contemporary standing doctrine.  
III. THE PROBLEM OF PRUDENCE AS JURISDICTION 
In the preceding sections my argument has been limited to the jurisdic-
tional nature of inferring a cause of action.  I have argued that the issue is 
not properly a jurisdictional one.  Whether the courts ought to employ a 
power within their jurisdiction is a matter of prudence, which I do not wish 
                                                                                                                              
tion, duty, and legal cause—rather than procedural or process ones are presented.”); Bellia, supra note 
26, at 831–32 (providing a similar analysis in terms of the meaning of a cause of action under writ 
pleading).   
313  See Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 773 (2000). 
314  Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819 (1997) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968)) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted); id. (“We have also stressed that the alleged injury must be legally and 
judicially cognizable.  This requires, among other things, that the plaintiff have suffered an invasion of a 
legally protected interest which is . . . concrete and particularized . . . .” (internal citation and quotation 
marks omitted)); id. at 820 (“[W]e must carefully inquire as to whether appellees have met their burden 
of establishing that their claimed injury is personal, particularized, concrete, and otherwise judicially 
cognizable.”). 
315  See supra note 303. 
316  See Bellia, supra note 26, at 851. 
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to address in this Article.  Rather, in this Part, I consider broadly the courts’ 
practice of treating matters of judicial prudence as matters of jurisdiction.  I 
begin with some doctrinal consequences of considering prudential matters 
under the guise of jurisdiction.  I turn next to the Court’s other unsuccessful 
forays into transforming prudential matters into jurisdictional ones.  I end 
by drawing some general conclusions. 
A. Doctrinal Havoc 
Turning first to doctrinal issues, I contend that pushing traditional mat-
ters of prudence into a jurisdictional framework leads to poor consequences.  
“As frequently happens where jurisdiction depends on subject matter, the 
question [of] whether jurisdiction exists . . . has been confused with the 
question [of] whether the complaint states a cause of action.”317  But even in 
cases of federal question jurisdiction, proper subject matter jurisdiction 
vests a federal court with the power to decide both successful and unsuc-
cessful suits.318  Although the Supreme Court’s admonishments never to 
conflate these two concepts are well intended, many lower federal courts 
are quick to note that “while distinguishing between a dismissal for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) and a dismissal for failure to 
state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) appears straightforward in theory, it is of-
ten much more difficult in practice.”319  Treating as jurisdictional the issue 
of an inference of a cause of action, which is best viewed as a matter of 
statutory construction or judicial policy more generally, does little to allevi-
ate this difficulty.  Rather, on both formal and pragmatic grounds, it merely 
muddles issues by pushing courts to decide cases on the merits under the 
guise of a Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional motion.   
As to the formal distinction, subject matter jurisdiction speaks to a 
court’s ability to resolve claims and defenses—in either the affirmative or 
negative.320  A failure to state a claim, by contrast, presupposes that a court 
 
  
317  Mont.-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Nw. Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246, 249 (1951); see also Fogel v. 
Chestnutt, 668 F.2d 100, 105–07 (2d Cir. 1981) (Friendly, J.) (providing an insightful discussion of the 
standard view). 
318  Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913). 
319  Nowak v. Ironworkers Local 6 Pension Fund, 81 F.3d 1182, 1187 (2d Cir. 1996); accord Primax 
Recoveries, Inc. v. Gunter, 433 F.3d 515, 517 (6th Cir. 2006); Estate of Harshman v. Jackson Hole 
Mountain Resort Corp., 379 F.3d 1161, 1166 (10th Cir. 2004); Carlson v. Principal Fin. Group, 320 F.3d 
301, 305–06 (2d Cir. 2003); Schwenker v. Molalla River Sch. Dist. No. 35, 2006 WL 3019828, at *3 (D. 
Or. Oct 19, 2006); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 11 cmt. e (1982) (explaining that “ques-
tion[s often] can plausibly be characterized either as going to subject matter jurisdiction or as being one 
of merits”); Joshua Schwartz, Note, Limiting Steel Co.: Recapturing a Broader “Arising Under” Juris-
dictional Question, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2255, 2261 (2004) (noting that “[c]ourts are often hard pressed 
to define the difference between jurisdiction and the merits and have been forced to concede that . . . [the 
distinction] is often much more difficult [to make] in practice” (footnote and internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  
320  See Lee, supra note 95, at 1620 (arguing that jurisdiction is a matter of “something like legiti-
mate authority”); Lees, supra note 95, at 1470–77 (listing the three major theories which seek to explain 
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has power to resolve a case, but that the plaintiff’s complaint contains some 
sort of legal infirmity or pleading defect on its face.321  Under the standard 
view, in a federal question jurisdiction case the issue of subject matter ju-
risdiction is both analytically distinct,322 and prior to,323 the issue of the 
plaintiff’s ability to state a claim.  As such, a 12(b)(1) motion serves a dis-
tinctly different purpose from that of a 12(b)(6) motion.  The former is, 
largely,324 a modern equivalent of a plea in abatement.325  As such, a 
12(b)(1) motion does not attack the merits of the plaintiff’s claim or the suf-
ficiency of the pleadings, but merely the propriety of the federal forum.326  
By challenging the propriety of the federal forum, the movant necessarily 
argues that the federal court lacks the power under either the Constitution or 
                                                                                                                              
the concept of jurisdiction as power, legitimacy and legislative control); see also Ex parte McCardle, 74 
U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868) (“Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the 
only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.”); Wasser-
man, supra note 95, at 670–78 (rejecting the practical import of Professor Lee’s view). 
321  See, e.g., Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946) (“[J]urisdiction . . . is not defeated . . . by the 
possibility that the averments might fail to state a cause of action on which petitioners could actually 
recover.”); 5B CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE § 1356 (3d ed. 2004) [hereinafter WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE] (discussing purpose 
of Rule 12(b)(6) motions). 
322  See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198–200 (1962) (discussing the fundamental difference 
between a dismissal on the merits and a jurisdictional dismissal); Ehm v. Nat’l. R.R. Passenger Corp., 
732 F.2d 1250, 1257 (5th Cir. 1984) (“A dismissal under both rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) has a fatal in-
consistency and cannot stand.  Federal jurisdiction is not so ambidextrous as to permit a district court to 
dismiss a suit for want of jurisdiction with one hand and to decide the merits with the other.” (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted)); Johnsrud v. Carter, 620 F.2d 29, 32–33 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding 
that dismissal on jurisdictional grounds and for failure to state a claim are analytically distinct, implicat-
ing different legal principles and different burdens of proof); cf. Winslow v. Walters, 815 F.2d 1114, 
1116 (7th Cir. 1987) (“[S]eeking summary judgment on a jurisdictional issue, therefore, is the equiva-
lent of asking a court to hold that because it has no jurisdiction the plaintiff has lost on the merits.  This 
is a nonsequitur.”). 
323  See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94–95 (1998) (holding that the 
notion of hypothetical jurisdiction is contrary to law); Mayor v. Cooper, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 247, 250 
(1867) (holding that “[i]f there were no jurisdiction, there was no power to do anything but to strike the 
case from the docket”); Deniz v. Municipality of Guaynabo, 285 F.3d 142, 149 (1st Cir. 2002) (“When a 
court is confronted with motions to dismiss under both Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), it ordinarily ought 
to decide the former before broaching the latter.”); Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th 
Cir. 2001) (accord). 
324  A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction can merely attack the sufficiency of 
the jurisdictional statement required by Rule 8(a)(1).  See 5C WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 
321, § 1363.  But such dismissals are not the focus of the present discussion. 
325  See 5B WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 321, (“Rules 12(b)(1) through 12(b)(5) and 
12(b)(7) essentially are defenses to the district court’s ability to proceed with the action.  They are mod-
ern counterparts to the common law pleas in abatement and do not go to the merits of a claim.”); Was-
serman, supra note 95, at 649–53 (discussing the “first phase” of litigation, during which jurisdictional 
questions are properly addressed); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1172 (7th ed. 1999) (Bryan A. Garner, 
ed.) (defining “plea in abatement”). 
326  5B WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 1349.  
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laws of the United States to hear the case.327  A 12(b)(6) motion, by con-
trast, is the modern equivalent of a demurrer.328  Again in contrast to a juris-
dictional challenge, the 12(b)(6) motion speaks to the merits of the claim or 
the plaintiff’s conformity to Rule 8(a)(2).329  Prudential issues that could bar 
recovery—such as whether the court should infer a cause of action—do not 
challenge the propriety of the federal forum.  Rather, they are challenges to 
the merits of plaintiff’s claim.330  An argument challenging the propriety of 
the inference of a cause of action, then, is not in reality a claim of “wrong 
court.”  It is actually a claim of “wrong statutory interpretation.”  The latter 
is squarely a merits issue.331 
This doctrinal havoc produces practical consequences as well.332  First, 
treating a question as jurisdictional has the consequence of raising the issue 
at the outset of the litigation process.333  Despite this early treatment, juris-
dictional issues, unlike a 12(b)(6) motion,334 are unwaivable and must be 
raised sua sponte by the court.335  Factual findings related to jurisdiction, un-
like the presumption of truthfulness employed in a 12(b)(6) motion,336 are 
often made by the court and are subject to deferential review on appeal.337  
Furthermore, the party alleging jurisdiction, not the movant, bears the bur-
den of establishing subject matter jurisdiction by a preponderance of the 
 
  
327  See, e.g., Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239 n.18 (1979) (describing subject matter jurisdic-
tion as the power of the court to hear a case).  
328  5B WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 1349 (“Rule 12(b)(6) is the successor of the common law 
demurrer and the code motion to dismiss and is a method of testing the sufficiency of the statement of 
the claim for relief.”). 
329  Id. 
330  See, e.g., JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY PLEADINGS, AND THE INCIDENTS 
THEREOF, ACCORDING TO THE PRACTICE OF THE COURTS OF EQUITY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 403 
(2d ed., Boston, Charles C. Little & James Brown 1840) (“The want of form, which is most usually in-
sisted on, is the want of due certainty in the allegations, or the loose and inartificial structure of the Bill, 
or the omission of some prescribed formularies.”) (emphasis added). 
331  See Wasserman, supra note 95, at 671–72 (“Merits ask whether the defendant’s conduct was le-
gally constrained (by the Constitution or by act of Congress); jurisdiction asks whether a federal court 
has the power to enforce that legal constraint on the defendant’s conduct.”). 
332  See generally id. at 662–69 (describing consequences).   
333  See, e.g., id. at 662; Perry Dane, Jurisdictionality, Time, and the Legal Imagination, 23 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 47 (1994). 
334  FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(2). 
335  FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3); Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506 (2006); United States v. 
Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002) (finding that “subject matter jurisdiction, because it involves the 
court’s power to hear a case, can never be forfeited or waived”); Dane, supra note 333, at 36–37 (noting 
that courts must raise jurisdictional questions sua sponte if the parties have not raised them).  
336  See, e.g., Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 171 (2005); Summit Health, Ltd. 
v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 325 (1991). 
337  Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 514 (“[I]f subject-matter jurisdiction turns on contested facts, the trial 
judge may be authorized to review the evidence and resolve the dispute on her own.”); Wasserman, su-
pra note 95, at 662. 
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evidence.338  Finally, a dismissal for want of jurisdiction also divests a fed-
eral court of pendent jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s related state law 
claims.339  Thus, the jurisdictional treatment of prudential matters has the 
improper effect of pushing on the merits review to the onset of trials with 
standards of review that are much harsher for plaintiffs than they would be 
under a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.  The treatment of prudential matters under 
the guise of jurisdiction, then, creates both doctrinal havoc and practical 
headaches. 
B. Ripeness Redux 
Unfortunately, this is not the Court’s first attempt at giving a jurisdic-
tional gloss to a traditionally prudential rule.  Of note here is the ripeness 
doctrine, where the Court’s current approach has been much decried.  
Moreover, the results of this move are strikingly similar to the dysfunctions 
presented by the movement to treat the inference of a cause of action as a 
jurisdictional question.  
Ripeness doctrine developed as a reaction to the rise of the administra-
tive state.340  Given the great potential for costly agency enforcement action, 
many potential defendants to such actions desired a judicial determination 
of their legal status pre-enforcement.341  In response, ripeness doctrine aims 
“to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from 
entangling themselves in abstract disagreements” with other organs of gov-
ernment.342  Pursuant to this end, the Court has stated that the question of 
ripeness turns on “the fitness of the issues for judicial decision” and the 
“hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.”343  That is, the 
ripeness inquiry boils down to a determination of whether refusing to hear a 
case until an agency acts would impose sufficient hardship on the parties.344 
 
  
338  See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(1); Thomson v. Gaskill, 315 U.S. 442, 446 (1942); Chayoon v. 
Chao, 355 F.3d 141, 143 (2d Cir. 2004); Hedgepeth v. Tennessee, 215 F.3d 608, 611 (6th Cir. 2000); 
Marcus v. Kan. Dep’t of Revenue, 170 F.3d 1305, 1309 (10th Cir. 1999). 
339  See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 285 
(1993); Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 817 n.15 (1986); Hagans v. Lavine, 415 
U.S. 528, 545–50 (1974). 
340  See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 
(1976) (describing extensive changes in judicial function under “public law” litigation from the private 
model of two-party disputes); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Ripeness and the Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 
153, 158 (1987) (“But the expansion of ‘public law’ litigation eventually forced the courts to stop inter-
preting the case or controversy standard by analogy to common law adjudication, and thus to abandon 
the legal interest test.” (footnote omitted)).  
341  See Nichol, supra note 340, at 161, 165. 
342  Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967). 
343  Id. at 149. 
344  Id. 
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This seems a wise use of judicial resources as a general rule.345  And 
prior to the 1970s, ripeness was generally considered a matter of prudential 
concern, which could be shaped and applied flexibly as individual cases 
warranted.346  In reaction to the Warren Court’s relaxing of these prudential 
rules, however, the Burger Court issued a series of rulings that both tight-
ened the ripeness inquiry and treated it as a jurisdictional issue mandated by 
Article III.347  
As Professor Nichol argues, this jurisdictional treatment of what had 
been considered a sound prudential policy wrought bad consequences.348  It 
transformed a flexible, factually intensive inquiry—one that took place after 
the parties had gathered evidence and presented it to the court—into a for-
mal legal question that now must be adjudicated within the early (and near-
ly evidence-free) confines of a Rule 12(b)(1) motion.349  This posture has 
reduced the ripeness inquiry to little more than an allegation in the com-
plaint of an imminent threat of harm. 
This categorization as a jurisdictional inquiry results in ripeness deci-
sions that now fall into three unattractive categories.  First, many ripeness 
decisions are simply redundant of the injury-in-fact inquiry posed by stand-
ing doctrine.350  I present the same critique of the Article III argument that 
 
  
345  See, e.g., KENNETH CULP DAVIS, 4 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 25:2 at 351–56 (2d ed. 
1983) (discussing the development of ripeness law); see also 13B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. 
MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3532 (3d ed. 2008) (“As com-
pared to standing, ripeness decisions have developed a generally satisfactory method for resolving the 
problems of prematurity.”); RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & PAUL R. VERKUIL, 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 199–202 (1985) (discussing the Supreme Court’s holding that a 
pharmaceutical company would suffer hardship if the Court did not review an FDA regulation before it 
was enforced).   
346  See, e.g., Toilet Goods Ass’n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158, 162–64 (1967); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 
497, 502–04 (1961) (stating that for its own prudential “governance” the Court has developed “a series 
of rules under which it has avoided passing upon a large part of all the constitutional questions pressed 
upon it for decision,” including the ripeness doctrine (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); 
Columbia Broad. Sys. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 425 (1942); Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 
297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 536 
(1925). 
347  See Nichol, supra note 340, at 162–63 (“[T]he Supreme Court has been clear that, although the 
ripeness demand may have begun as an exercise in judicial discretion, it is now firmly planted in the 
Constitution.  In a series of cases dating from the mid-1970s, the Court has conflated the ripeness in-
quiry and the case or controversy requirement of article III, repeatedly describing the ripeness inquiry as 
a ‘threshold’ determination designed to measure whether the ‘actual controversy’ . . . requirement im-
posed by Art[icle] III of the Constitution is met.” (alterations in original) (footnotes omitted)). 
348  Id. at 180 (“The benefits of disassociating ripeness from the case or controversy requirement of 
article III are numerous.”). 
349  Id. at 182 (“More fundamentally, constitutionalizing ripeness is at odds with the flexible nature 
of the doctrine.  The announcement that the premature adjudication of claims violates the Constitution 
suggests a rigidity and uniformity of analysis, as well as an adherence to principle, that have little in 
common with ripeness review.”). 
350  See, e.g., MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 128 n.8 (2007) (“As respondents 
acknowledge, standing and ripeness boil down to the same question in this case.”); Nichol, supra note 
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inferring a cause of action is extrajurisdictional.351  Second, many ripeness 
cases can be seen as little more than Rule 12(b)(6) motion decisions on the 
merits.352  But when ripeness inquiries are treated as a jurisdictional matter, 
all the burdens are shifted to the plaintiff at an early stage, contrary to the 
thrust of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure’s preference for on-the-merits 
decisions.  This same infirmity applies to the argument that inferring a 
cause of action is extrajurisdictional.353  Finally, many ripeness decisions are 
not challenges to the propriety of the federal forum, but rather to the wis-
dom of its use.354  That is, they are not pleas in abatement, but demurrers.  
Again, this same defect plagues the jurisdictional argument against the in-
ference of causes of action.355  Others have made nearly identical points in 
regard to the move to treat standing as a function of Article III jurisdiction 
as opposed to a flexible rule of prudence.356 
What these results illustrate, I contend, is that prudential matters sim-
ply do not translate well into the procedural and formalistic confines of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction.  First, the attempts appear to lead inevitably to 
redundant standing analyses or inappropriately timed on-the-merits reviews.  
Second, the prudential decision to find that a case is ripe requires a case-by-
case review of the actual circumstances of particular cases, not a formal rule 
                                                                                                                              
340, at 172 (“The problem with this line of ripeness cases, therefore, is not the enterprise undertaken.  
Rather, it is doubtful that they are truly ripeness determinations at all.  In measuring whether the litigant 
has asserted an injury that is real and concrete rather than speculative and hypothetical, the ripeness in-
quiry merges almost completely with standing analysis.  The standing requirement, the cornerstone of 
the Burger Court’s article III jurisprudence, demands that a litigant show that he personally ‘has suffered 
some threatened or actual injury’ as the result of the conduct of the defendant.  This requirement of par-
ticularized actual injury repeatedly has been treated by the Court not only as constitutionally mandated, 
but as the very core of the standing determination.” (footnotes omitted)). 
351  See supra Part II.B.2.   
352  Nichol, supra note 340, at 169 (“[A] necessary implication of the Court’s moves to constitution-
alize the ripeness doctrine, therefore, is an assertion that the judiciary has no power to address the ‘pre-
mature’ issues considered in the ripeness cases.  When the Court uses the ripeness standard in decisions 
such as those discussed above, however, it does make a judgment on the merits.”). 
353  See supra Part III.A.  
354  Nichol, supra note 340, at 176 (“The balancing contemplated by Abbott Laboratories, however, 
includes a range of concerns broader than the dictates of the claim on the merits.  Other considerations 
can caution against review.  Ripeness analysis has been used, for example, as a tool by the Court to help 
ensure precision in judicial decision making and to prevent judicial intrusions on proper and efficient 
allocation of governmental powers.”). 
355  See supra Part III.A.   
356  Professor Fletcher, for example, has noted: 
As currently constructed, standing is a preliminary jurisdictional requirement, formulated at a high 
level of generality and applied across the entire domain of law.  In individual cases, the generality 
of the doctrine often forces us to leave unarticulated important considerations that bear on the 
question of whether standing should be granted or denied.  This consequence is obvious in the ap-
parent lawlessness of many standing cases when the wildly vacillating results in those cases are 
explained in the analytic terms made available by current doctrine.  But we mistake the nature of 
the problem if we condemn the results in standing cases.  The problem lies, rather, in the structure 
of the doctrine. 
Fletcher, supra note 303, at 223.  
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about the availability of a federal forum.357  Similarly, the decision to infer a 
cause of action requires a statute-by-statute analysis.  In addition to the in-
terpretation of the text, such an analysis, even if focused solely upon con-
gressional intent, may require sensitive, statute-by-statute, temporal 
determinations358 about the legislative expectations of a Congress enacting 
legislation in 1890,359 1964,360 or 1991361—in which Congress legislated 
against differing background judicial norms concerning the courts’ willing-
ness to infer causes of action.  A formalistic rule seems inapplicable to the 
task presented.  Finally, even if one were to believe that a rule of prudence 
should be mandatory, there is no reason to jump to the conclusion that such 
a rule must be a jurisdictional one.  Professor Dodson in a recent piece per-
 
  
357  Nichol, supra note 340, at 183 (“Ripeness, as Young demonstrates, often calls for a uniquely 
case-oriented evaluation of the practical probabilities presented by the litigation.  As Professor Jaffe ar-
gued, the doctrine demands ‘reasoned balancing of certain typical and relevant factors for and against 
the assumption of jurisdiction.’  If the ripeness calculus is rooted in the Constitution, however, the Ab-
bott Laboratories balancing process certainly will be skewed.” (footnotes omitted)). 
358  Compare Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287–88 (2001) (“Nor do we agree with the 
Government that our cases interpreting statutes enacted prior to Cort v. Ash have given dispositive 
weight to the expectations that the enacting Congress had formed in light of the contemporary legal con-
text.” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)), with id. at 315 n.25 (advancing the opposite posi-
tion) and Mank, Legal Context, supra note 16 (discussing the role of contextual evidence in interpreting 
statutes).   
359  See, e.g., Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1 
(2006)).  During that period, the courts regularly assumed a remedy was available for statutory rights.  
See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 374–75 (1982) (“Under 
this approach, federal courts, following a common-law tradition, regarded the denial of a remedy as the 
exception rather than the rule.”); California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 299-300 (1981) (“[In 1890,] 
Members of Congress merely assumed that the federal courts would follow the ancient maxim, ubi jus, 
ibi remedium.” (quotation marks omitted)); Creswell, supra note 16, at 975 (“Justice Pitney [in Rigsby] 
emphasized that he was applying a well-recognized common-law doctrine.”); Foy, supra note 19, at 554 
(“Justice Pitney wrote for the Court in Rigsby . . . .  [Yet] Justices Story or Marshall could have written 
the opinion.  Indeed, Coke or Chief Justice Holt could have written it.  Rigsby looked to the past, not to 
the future.”). 
360  See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 241.  Again, during this Borak era, Congress rea-
sonably expected the courts to supply remedies for statutory violations.  See, e.g., Cannon v. Univ. of 
Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 688–89 (1979) (holding that the 1964 Congress expected the courts to provide a 
remedy for rights created by the Act); id. at 718 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (“We do not write on an en-
tirely clean slate, however, and the Court’s opinion demonstrates that Congress, at least during the pe-
riod of the enactment of the several Titles of the Civil Rights Act, tended to rely to a large extent on the 
courts to decide whether there should be a private cause of action, rather than determining this question 
for itself.  Cases such as J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, . . . and numerous cases from other federal courts, gave 
Congress good reason to think that the federal judiciary would undertake this task.”). 
361  See, e.g., Americans with Disabilities Act, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 12101–12113 (2006)).  Given the radically different judicial environment, this Act, perhaps, 
requires a different interpretative approach.  See, e.g., Cannon, 441 U.S. at 718 (Rehnquist, J., concur-
ring) (“It seems to me that the factors to which I have here briefly adverted apprise the lawmaking 
branch of the Federal Government that the ball, so to speak, may well now be in its court.  Not only is it 
‘far better’ for Congress to so specify when it intends private litigants to have a cause of action, but for 
this very reason this Court in the future should be extremely reluctant to imply a cause of action absent 
such specificity on the part of the Legislative Branch.”). 
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suasively argues this point.362  He notes that while jurisdictional rules are 
necessarily mandatory, the converse—that mandatory rules are necessarily 
jurisdictional—does not hold.363  Following Dodson’s lead, one might well 
consider the bar upon inferring a cause of action as mandatory, yet still con-
sider the question as a merits issue.  
CONCLUSION 
The argument in favor of a jurisdictional bar upon the inference of a 
cause of action by the federal courts is a poor one.  This movement to view 
the third branch of government, as Justice Scalia styles it, as a system of 
tribunals is predicated upon a faulty view of § 1331 jurisdiction.  Further, 
the Article III version of the tribunals position fails to provide a convincing 
rule of constitutional construction.  Finally, this jurisdictional move, like 
others in the past, leads to doctrinal and practical headaches that are not 
worth their costs.  In short, the federal judiciary is a system of full-fledged 
courts with all the powers attendant thereto.  Whether any particular power, 
such as the ability to infer a cause of action, should be used is properly a 
matter of judicial prudence.364  As such, advocates of the tribunals position 
cannot hide behind the mantle of jurisdiction as an excuse for not providing 
a palatable normative defense for what amounts to a restrictive policy pref-
erence. 
 
 
 
  
362  See Scott Dodson, Mandatory Rules, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2008) (arguing that nonjurisdictional 
rules may still retain some of the features of a jurisdictional rule, such as being mandatory, without ab-
sorbing every other feature of a jurisdictional rule). 
363  Id. at 5–6. 
364  See Strauss, supra note 21, at 924 (commenting on Sandoval and concluding that “[t]he reason-
ing here is not that federal courts cannot adopt suggested legal principles in common law fashion, but 
that it may be unwise for them to do so when those principles turn on assessments better suited for legis-
lative than adjudicative fact-finding”). 
